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Abstract: This paper examines the ways in which lower-income households obtain basic finan-
cial services in urban communities in the United States and in Mexico.  In addition, the paper 
discusses the efforts that private sector and government organizations are making to lower the 
cost or improve the quality of those services. It summarizes available information on these issues 
and assesses the rationale and challenges facing the strategies that both countries are employing 
to improve the financial services available to lower-income households, giving particular atten-
tion to “unbanked” households, meaning households that do not have deposit accounts with any 
regulated deposit-taking institution, and also to lower-income households in large urban areas.  
 
In comparing the experiences of the two countries the paper reviews the extent to which 
lower-income households are unbanked, their use of non-bank financial services, and strategies 
for improving financial services to the unbanked. The underlying differences between the coun-
tries’ typical household incomes - national income per capita in Mexico in 2002 was U.S. 
$8,540, compared with $35,060 in the United States (World Bank, 2003) – may also influence  
the difference in percentage of unbanked - 9.1 percent of families in the U.S. compared to 76.4 
found in a recent study in Mexico City.  
 
The paper surveys data on the urban unbanked in the U.S.  It asks five questions.  Who 
are the unbanked?  Where do the unbanked get basic financial services?  Why don’t the un-
banked use banks?  What is the problem with being unbanked?  And, finally, what private-sector 
and government initiatives are underway to improve financial services for the unbanked?  It then 
addresses the same questions for Mexico. The answers to these questions are offered in a sum-
mary comparative form in the introduction. In both countries unbanked households are similarly 
characterized by low income and education levels although in Mexico the unbanked include per-
sons well above the median income. The unbanked in both countries tend to rely on cash transac-
tions and on services provided by commercial outlets, although in Mexico the unbanked rely on 
informal forms of saving and borrowing not present in the U.S. At the same time, the unbanked 
in Mexico show a high rate of home ownership, suggesting an alternative form of saving not pre-
sent in the U.S.  As to why the unbanked do not use banks, in both countries the issue of trust 
appears to a minor degree, but while the unbanked in Mexico perceive barriers in the costs and 
requirements of financial institutions, in the U.S. the unbanked point to their own financial situa-
tion and lack of savings as a reason for not using banks. In both countries the unbanked pay a 
significant cost in terms of additional transaction fees, time, and insecurity, in not using formal 
sector financial services. Concerning initiatives to improve access to financial services, the U.S. 
has a longer history of both regulatory and private sector practices encouraging retail banking 
practices. The Mexican government has recently begun to address the situation by focusing on 
the “popular” banking sector, and assisting credit unions and cooperatives to develop broader 
services. In its final section, the paper analyzes the rationale and challenges facing the strategies 
that both countries are employing to improve the financial services available to lower-income 
households. 
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Preface  
 
This paper was written at the request of a World Bank team examining access to financial 
services in Mexico and Colombia.  At the time, 2002, the unbanked, and the financial service 
needs of households represented a new issue for the World Bank.  Previous Bank work on access 
to financial services had focused on access to credit– specifically for small businesses, rural and 
agri-business and housing.  Indeed, the Bank has a long history of supporting access to credit for 
small and micro business, for rural development and for housing in the interest of furthering eco-
nomic development and increased productivity in client countries.  
 
Until recently, however, other financial services such as savings, payments and transfers 
at the household level have not figured in the World Bank research or project agenda.  While the 
existence of high percentages of “unbanked” households in developing countries and the con-
trasting high percentages of “banked” households in developed countries has long been acknowl-
edged, links between access to these financial services and increased economic growth have not 
been well documented.  The high percentages of unbanked households and low access to formal 
savings, payment and transfer instruments was generally viewed as a symptom of under-
development, but not a factor in development.   
 
Beginning, however, in 2002 World Bank Department of Finance, Private Sector and In-
frastructure for the Latin American and Caribbean Region began to look at issues of access to 
financial services more broadly, and to enquire from the household point of view what services 
might be needed or in demand and what costs were associated with lacking access to formal sec-
tor financing institutions.  The work in Latin America, beginning with studies in Brazil, Colom-
bia Mexico has since led to the creation of a new Bank-wide working group on issues of access 
to financial services in general and on the unbanked in specific terms.   
 
This new work began with a review of the literature which relates access to financial ser-
vices to economic development (that is the broad coverage of formal sector financial institutions, 
measured by holding of deposit accounts), as well as the experiences of developed countries 
which have put in place programs to help increase access to banking services.    
 
The literature on access to financial services and economic growth begins with Walter 
Bagehot who noted in 1873 the important role of the financial sector in England’s economic 
growth when financial markets were able to mobilize savings to finance the implementation of 
new technologies in England. Walter Rostow linked financial intermediation to economic devel-
opment in his studies of economic growth in the 1950’s. More recent empirical studies have 
demonstrated not only that the development of financial sectors accompanies economic devel-
opment  (Goldsmith, 1969, King and Levine, 1993), but also that financial development is neces-
sary for economic development.  Others have convincingly demonstrated that deeper financial 
markets can help reduce aggregate volatility (Caprio and Honohan, 2001.) Certainly a formal 
banking system with widespread coverage is a consistent characteristic of developed economies, 
while widespread financial exclusion is associated with lesser-developed countries. 
Links between access to financial services and growth are several. Rostow’s argument 
that countries achieving an aggregate savings level above 5% of GDP will reach a level of rein-
vestment leading to economic “take-off” implies a certain link between financial intermediation 
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and growth, insofar as it is access to financial services which convert aggregate savings to aggre-
gate investment. Savings kept at home (under the mattress or in a tin can) cannot contribute to 
economic growth. By the same token, unbanked entrepreneurs who cannot obtain credit also rep-
resent an opportunity cost to a national economy. Hernando de Soto has argued that access to 
capital and to financial services is the key to economic growth both in advanced economies and 
in the developing world (de Soto, 2000.)  
Access to financial services can help promote equity, and can, in this context, be linked to 
better economic equilibrium and to faster economic growth (Stegman, 1999.) Recent research 
has centered on the impact of access to credit on micro-economic development, suggesting that 
improving the access of micro-enterprises to financial services could have an important positive 
impact on a country’s income distribution (Westley, 2001.)  Other literature links better income 
distribution to macro-economic growth. Surveys of the literature on financial intermediation and 
poverty reduction conclude that development of the financial sector contributes to economic 
growth and thereby to poverty alleviation (Holden and Prokopenko, 2001.) Finally on-going re-
search at the World Bank looking at cross-cutting evidence substantiates the hypothesis that 
“countries with better-developed financial intermediaries experience faster declines in measures 
of both poverty and income inequality.” (Beck,Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2004.) 
A number of recent studies have looked at the positive results stemming from access to a 
broad range of financial services and payment system services (Christen, 2000; Wenner and 
Campos, 1998). Reports from the development banking community and studies of international 
NGOs (Dichter, 1997), strongly suggest that lower income families need a wide range of com-
plementary financial services both for everyday life and for asset building purposes (Caskey, 
2001; Robinson, 2001; Rutherford, 1999). 
 
In the USA, the responsibility of government to “bring its broad-based experience in 
capital markets and financial services to bear on the inner city” was underlined in 1997 by the 
then Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Rubin. Referring to an initiative that gave Treasury the 
responsibility of bringing unbanked welfare recipients into the mainstream banking system, 
Rubin declared. “If this works… it will not only give them a more efficient way to cash checks 
and access to other financial services, but it may also encourage people to save, to plan finan-
cially and, therefore, to improve their economic life over time.” 
 
A further argument to link broader coverage of financial services to economic growth 
comes from the private sector.  Experience from high-income countries demonstrates that niche 
“community development” financial institutions catering to low-income clients can be good 
businesses. Recent studies by the US Federal Reserve and the Office of Controller of the Cur-
rency have favorably compared the profitability of investments under the Community Reinvest-
ment Act credits to commercial investments, and the profitability of community development 
financing institutions to other start-up banks. Indeed the fact that the banking crisis experienced 
in the US in the 1980’s – the results of deregulated banks’ over-investing in high risk venture -- 
did not in fact cause a major sector collapse – as occurred in Mexico and in Colombia under 
similar circumstances, has been attributed to the fact that the US banks had spread their business 
over a wider gamut and depend on a variety of population sectors, not just the wealthy.  Anecdo-
tal evidence from banks such as Banco Popular of Puerto Rico, Union Bank of California, Pa-
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cific Bank of San Francisco, First Community Bank of Boston1, Harris Bank of Chicago, Bank-
America and CitiBank Corp, all major banks with strong business lines in low-income, immi-
grant communities, all suggest that working with the poor and the unbanked is good business. 
 
Regarding the second new direction the World Bank team took in approaching the issue 
of the unbanked in Latin America, learning from and working with experts in developing coun-
tries, particularly the United States, has considerably enriched the Bank’s work. The USA has a 
long history of promoting access to financial services and on working with the commercial bank-
ing sector to help the poor build assets. Inputs from current and former staff of the Office of 
Controller of the Currency, from Fannie Mae, from FDIC have been invaluable, as have the col-
laborative efforts of teams from Ford Foundation, Annie E. Casey Foundation, Woodstock and 
Brookings Institutions.  Moreover, recounts of experiences from private banks have been ex-
tremely illuminating. Finally, the work of scholars who have studied the issues in the US has 
served as both model and benchmark.  In the same vein, the World Bank team has drawn on 
knowledge and experience of policy makers from Germany and Spain. Such links represent a 
break from much past work in access to financial services, which tended to emphasize experi-
ences mainly cited from developing countries, on the grounds that the experiences of developed 
countries depend on too advanced an economic level to be replicable outside of the OECD. 
 
Partnering or “twinning” as sharing experiences between developed and developing 
countries has been referred to, has been successful in other sectors.  In this case, the collabora-
tion of experts from the US, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico in the World Bank initiative has led to 
a new partnering in the area of access to financial services for the unbanked. This paper is an ex-
ample of a product of the partnership in the course of the World Bank’s work on the unbanked in 
Latin America. The discussions of John Caskey and Clemente Ruiz, two scholars and leading 
experts in the field of access to financial services, one from the United States and one from Mex-
ico led to comparisons between the two countries. In this paper Caskey and Ruiz put to rest any 
lingering reluctance to make comparisons between developed and developing countries in favor 
of greater mutual understanding. They also demonstrate that, contrary to the some previous as-
sumptions, there are important lessons to be learned from both sides, and there are replicable ex-
periences. Indeed, as Caskey and Ruiz point out, private banks are already adapting mechanisms, 
and strategies for reaching the unbanked across borders. Equally important, they have set the 
stage for continued dialogue based on a serious analysis of issues, and consideration of solutions, 
in other countries concerned with the problems of the unbanked.  
 
 
Tova Maria Solo  
Washington, D.C.
                                                 
1 A subsidiary of Fleet Bank and now of Bankamerica 
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I.  Introduction and Summary Findings 
 
This paper examines the ways in which lower-income households obtain basic financial 
services in urban communities in the United States and in Mexico.  In addition, the paper dis-
cusses the efforts that private sector and government organizations are making to lower the cost 
or improve the quality of those services. The goal of the paper is to summarize available infor-
mation on these issues and to assess the rationale and challenges facing the strategies that both 
countries are employing to improve the financial services available to lower-income households.    
 
In the paper, we give particular attention to “unbanked” households, by which we strictly 
mean households that do not have deposit accounts with any regulated deposit-taking institution.  
But we also use the term more broadly to include lower-income households that use high-cost 
informal-sector non-bank lenders when they seek consumer loans.  In many cases, these are un-
banked households, but they may also include households with deposit accounts.   
 
As noted above, our emphasis in the paper is on lower-income households living in large 
urban areas.  Two considerations explain this focus.  First, in both countries, the best survey data 
on the use of financial services among lower-income households applies only to urban areas.  
Second, while there are undoubtedly many similarities among the unbanked in rural and urban 
areas, there are also differences in the financial institutions with which they interact and differ-
ences the reasons that these households are unbanked.  To try to cover both the rural and urban 
unbanked in two countries in one paper, would make this rather long paper much longer and less 
focused.  
 
Before plunging into the details, it is useful to review some distinguishing features of the 
two countries that explain some major differences in the extent to which lower-income house-
holds are unbanked, their use of non-bank financial services, and strategies for improving finan-
cial services to the unbanked.  Most importantly, there is a substantial difference in typical 
household incomes across the two countries.  On a purchasing power parity basis, national in-
come per capita in Mexico in 2002 was U.S. $8,540 p.a., while it was $35,060 p.a. in the United 
States (World Bank, 2003).  This difference means that what we consider to be a lower-income 
household in the U.S. would often qualify as a middle-income household in Mexico.  The differ-
ence in typical household incomes between Mexico and the U.S. also creates a substantial differ-
ence in the percentage of households who are unbanked.  Based on 1992 data, the research divi-
sion of the US Federal Reserve concluded in 1997 that 151 percent of families in the U.S. do not 
have any type of transaction accounts.  In Mexico City, a recent survey found that 76.4 percent 
of households in the same situation.   
 
Numerous other distinguishing features of the two countries contribute to differences in 
the percentage of unbanked households and ways that they obtain financial services.  Here we 
mention three.  First, banking in Mexico is much more concentrated than in the U.S. In 2004, the 
year of the World Bank study, Mexico had fewer than 20 commercial banks and a similar num-
ber of registered cooperatives and credit unions in Mexico City2. The five largest banks hold 82 
percent of all deposits.  The United States, in contrast, has over 10,000 banks, without counting 
                                                 
2 The number of registered cooperatives and credit unions has since grown significantly, but mostly outside of Mex-
ico City.  
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cooperatives and credit unions. In New York City, one of the more highly concentrated urban 
markets in the U.S, the five largest banks account for 54 percent of all deposits.  Competition for 
deposits is also more varied in the United States.  Large commercial banks compete with com-
munity banks, thrifts, and credit unions, all of which are regulated and offer deposit insurance.  
In Mexico, non-bank savings institutions are much smaller and many have traditionally been 
largely unregulated.   Second, computerized credit histories for consumers and automated credit 
risk assessments are highly developed in the U.S. and cover nearly all working adults.  In Mex-
ico, such institutions are far less comprehensive and sufficiently less developed that there can be 
little meaningfully predictive automated credit risk assessments for most lower-income Mexican 
households.  Third, labor costs are significantly less in Mexico compared to the U.S.  This means 
that labor-displacing financial service technologies employed in the U.S. may not be appropriate 
in the Mexican context.  Despite these differences, however, this paper identifies many parallels 
in the issues that the two countries face in trying to improve financial services for lower-income 
households, even if the scale and context of the problem differs.   
 
Who are the unbanked?   
 
In both countries, the unbanked are characterized by lower incomes and lower education 
levels than the population at large, and they also tend to be marginalized in socio economic 
terms.  In Mexico this is inferred by the high percentage of unbanked dependent on the informal 
sector, while in the U.S. it is defined by the disproportionate representation of immigrant and 
minority groups. (According to US Federal Reserve Bank reports based on surveys of consumer 
finance from 1997, 54% of the unbanked are Latin American migrants, compared with 15.1% 
over the population as a whole3.)  However, although in line with income and education levels 
overall, the percentage of unbanked is markedly greater in Mexico than in the U.S. Surprisingly, 
home ownership among the unbanked is also greater in Mexico.   
 
The Unbanked in Mexico and the U.S have similarities and differences  
 
 
Similarities 
 
% of Unbanked Households below Median Income  90%  79% 
% of Unbanked with household head less  
than High School Education    51%  56% 
 
% of Unbanked Socio-Economically Marginalized 
- Immigrant or Minority Group in US    90% 
- Informal economic sector in Mexico  60 
 
Differences      Mexico   U.S. 
 
Overall Percentage of Unbanked Households  75%  15.1%  
Home ownership among Unbanked Households  63%  7.8% 
 
                                                 
3 Kennickkell et. al, 1997 
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Where do the unbanked get basic financial services? 
 
The unbanked in both countries tend to rely on cash transactions and on services provided 
by commercial outlets, although in México the unbanked rely on informal forms of saving and 
borrowing not present in the U.S. At the same time, the unbanked in México show a high rate of 
home ownership, suggesting an alternative form of saving not present in the U.S.   
 
In both countries the majority of unbanked are paid by check or by deposit to a third 
party account. Less than a fifth of the U.S. group and a tenth of the Mexican group are paid in 
cash. This suggests an important cost to the unbanked in transaction costs. At the least it involves 
a trip to a bank, at most, a commission paid to cash a check or to access a third party account.  
 
The unbanked in both countries face additional costs in making payments. In the U.S. 
unbanked persons generally rely on payment services associated with the “check cashing out-
lets”, a service industry which has grown up in response to the unbanked’ needs. Among the 
“CCOs” those associated with “payday lending4” have been under investigation recently for 
predatory lending. In Mexico the unbanked carry out their transactions in cash at a cost of travel 
and time, although focus groups also report that the unbanked frequently circulate signed checks 
as a form of cash or cash checks in stores where they also (by obligation) make purchases.  
 
USA- How the Unbanked make payments 
 
Cash                                         36% 
Check                                         5% 
Money order/ 
Bill payment services              35% 
(Mostly through check cashing operations) 
Mexico- How the Unbanked make payments 
 
Cash                                             95-99% 
Check                                             2-3% 
 
 
In terms of borrowing, surveys looked at what credit sources the unbanked have used in 
the previous three years.  Interestingly, family, friends and third parties make up the principal 
sources of loans, in both countries suggesting the importance of informal support network for 
marginalized groups in the United States. (Recall that a high percentage of the unbanked are re-
cent immigrants and minority groups.)  In Mexico, friends cover about the same percentage for 
credit needs as in the US (between 8-9%) but the retail stores lead in importance as lenders to 
about half of the unbanked population. Government programs –absent in the US - also have a 
small but significant presence providing credit to about 6% of the unbanked in Mexico.  
                                                 
4 Payday lending actually refers to loans made between paychecks, guaranteed by the turn over of the paycheck to 
the lender on payday.  
 
Payments received      US A  Mexico 
 
By Check       50.5%  85.6% 
(Check cashing operations charges 2-3%) 
 
In Cash        18.8%    7.8% 
 
Direct bank deposit       16.6%    6.3% 
(to third party account) 
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Where do the Unbanked borrow? 
 
 
In both countries the majority of the unbanked households report that they have no finan-
cial savings. Nonetheless, a significant percentage of the unbanked do save in cash, especie or 
other informal means. In Mexico this percentage translates into approximately one-fifth of the 
country’s population, while in the U.S. it represents around 2%. (The unbanked in Mexico repre-
sent close to 75% of the population compared to less than 10% of the U.S. population.) The high 
rate of home ownership among Mexico’s unbanked adds further evidence to their capacity to 
save.  
 
 
What is the problem with being unbanked?   
 
From the forgoing, it is possible to make some estimates of what the unbanked in both 
countries pay for financial transactions.  One telling comparison, for example,  in Mexico arises 
from the use of credit from retail stores, at monthly interest rates of  between 15 - 30%, or with 6 
–10% per month from the credit unions. These rates are well over the interest charged by credit 
card companies, let alone bank lending rates. But costs of being unbanked depend, of course on 
the household situation.  We assume that all unbanked households must pay utility bills, both in 
the U.S.A. and in Mexico. Additionally, for those who save, there are costs associated with not 
having access to a bank deposit account. Finally, costs associated with receiving payments, such 
as check-cashing are calculated.  The accumulated costs can run up to 4% of a median income in 
the US, or to 15% of median income in Mexico.  Credit is not factored into this estimate, but for 
U.S. families using pay day lender services, or for Mexicans buying goods on a lay-away plan, 
the percentage of income devoted to financial services affecting the unbanked would be higher.  
 
Savings Mechanisms      US A        Mexico 
Informal savings –  
cash, money orders, signed checks, clubs, loans, jewelry etc.  20.5%  28% 
 
Home ownership          7.8%  63% 
 
No financial savings      68.6%  56% 
 
USA        Mexico 
Bank                                             5.9%    Cred it Union            1.4% 
Finance Company                        2.8%    Finance Company                  2.9% 
Mortgage company                      0.3%    Savings Bank                         4.3% 
Family                                        16.6%    Savings and loan association 1.4% 
Friend                                           8.4%    Friend                                      8.6% 
Car dealer                                    2.3%    NGOs                                       1.4% 
Retail store                                   1.9%    Department store                  48.6% 
Individual(who charges interest)            0.4%    Government                            5.7%
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Cost to the Unbanked for payment services– estimates refer to median income household 
 
USA                                    2.5% - 4% 
Mexico                                5% - 15 % 
Plus- lost interest on savings, lost time, cost of cashing checks and receiving payments all of which adds up to less than optimal choices for sav-
ings, investments and borrowing 
 
 
Why don’t the unbanked use banks?   
 
As to why the unbanked do not use banks, in both countries the issue of trust appears to a 
minor degree, but while the unbanked in Mexico perceive barriers in the costs and requirements 
of financial institutions, in the U.S. the unbanked point to their own financial situation and lack 
of savings as a reason for not using banks. In both countries the unbanked pay a significant cost 
in terms of additional transaction fees, time, and insecurity, in not using formal sector financial 
services. Concerning initiatives to improve access to financial services, the U.S. has a longer his-
tory of both regulatory and private sector practices encouraging retail banking practices. The 
Mexican government has recently begun to address the situation by focusing on the “popular” 
banking sector, and assisting credit unions and cooperatives to develop broader services. 
 
Here a serious difference emerges.  While a similarly serious percentage of each group 
(close to one-fifth) underline their discomfort with or lack of trust in banks, the unbanked in the 
United States do not consider that they have enough money to justify opening an account, 
whereas the unbanked in Mexico City point to the high costs of opening an account in Mexico 
City. Actually further analysis from CONDUSEF showed that the main commercial bank sav-
ings programs in 2003 were not affordable to 75% of the population, based on an initial and 
minimum deposit equal half of monthly earnings and maintenance fees of 1% of monthly earn-
ings.  
 
Reasons  
 
And, finally, what private-sector and government initiatives are underway to improve fi-
nancial services for the unbanked? 
 
In both countries governments and the banking industry have developed strategies to help 
the unbanked gain access to financial services. Both countries have developed programs to sup-
port microfinance institutions through grants (USA and Mexico) and subsidized credit programs. 
The US supports community development institutions, while Mexico’s focus is on lenders to 
small businesses, car retail and new home developers. In addition, the Mexican government has 
long managed a postal savings program and is currently developing a major regulatory capability 
to stimulate growth and modernization in the “social financial sector” (cooperatives and credit 
Reasons For Not Using Banks  USA       Mexico
Don’t need account – no savings   53%        7% 
Fees and min imum balance too high  45%       70% 
Want to keep records private   22%         2% 
Not comfortable with banks/don’t trust  18%       16% 
Inconvenience – location and hours   10%         2% 
Banks won’t let us/lack of documentation   10%         3% 
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unions.)  The US has experimented with regulatory policies and incentive programs, aimed at 
both the banks, the informal lenders and at the unbanked themselves.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Mexico 
Public policy focus on Non-Banking Institutions  
BANSEFI – Regulating and setting up electronic base for cooperative and social sector 
SOFOLES – Lending to finance corporations for housing, car and business loans 
PRONAFIM -  Grants to micro finance companies 
 
Innovation by Mexican Banks 
Banco Azteca – New and outside the banking sector - virtually without competition  
Banamex and Compartamos has introduced a debit card option 
 
 
USA 
 Public policy initiatives:  
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) applies mild pressure on banks to maintain offices in low-income 
communit ies and offer low-cost bank accounts.  
 Support for Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) that specialize in serving low-income 
communit ies.   
Some states use price controls for non-banks that provide payment or credit services to the unbanked. 
 
 Public and private sector ini tiatives focusing on new products:   
Pay cards, Electronic Transfer Accounts, ID Cards for non-registered aliens 
 
Educating the Unbanked:  
Savings and lending education intended to help lower-income households to build savings and improve 
credit histories, which are the main barriers to accessing mainstream financial institutions.  Individual
Development Accounts (IDAs) increase incentive to save. 
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II:  The Urban Unbanked in the United States 
 
This section uses a survey of households conducted in lower-income communities in 
New York City and Los Angeles to profile the unbanked and to explain why they are unbanked.  
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the agency that charters and regulates na-
tional banks, conducted this high-quality survey of the use of financial services by residents in 
low- and moderate-income census tracts in both cities in 1998.  The survey sampled 2,000 adults 
asking, among other things, numerous questions about how they receive and make payments.  
The surveys were conducted by telephone and in face-to-face interviews.  The interviews were 
conducted in either English or Spanish depending on the respondent’s choice.  Because of care-
ful design and persistent efforts, the OCC obtained a remarkable 70 percent response rate.  For 
people using the survey data, the OCC supplies a set of weights to convert the sample responses 
into responses representative of the 2.6 million adults living in the low- and moderate-income 
census tracts of the two cities.  All of the tables in this paper based on the OCC survey use the 
weighted data.   
 
For our purposes, there are two weaknesses to the survey.  First, it focused on only the 
residents of two large cities who may not be representative of urbanized lower-income house-
holds generally. As a result the percentage of unbanked in this survey is higher than that given by 
the Federal Reserve’s 1997 percentage for the country at large5. Both of these cities, for example, 
have much larger Hispanic and immigrant populations than is typical of American cities.  And 
New York has a lower percentage of homeowners than is typical of American cities.  Second, the 
OCC with little discernable rational basis decided to omit a number of survey responses from the 
publicly released data base.  Consider one example.  The OCC survey asked people without bank 
accounts why they did not have an account and read a list of reasons that they could agree with, 
including such reasons as “don’t have enough money,” “bank fees are too high,” etc.  The public 
data set includes peoples’ responses to this question.  The OCC survey followed this question 
with an identical question with a second set of possible reasons, such as “you need a Social Secu-
rity number to open an account,” “bank won’t let you open an account,” etc.  The public data set 
does not include peoples’ responses to this question.  Despite these weaknesses, the OCC data 
provides a number of insights into the use of financial services by lower-income urban house-
holds.   
 
 Table 1 presents an overview of the socioeconomic characteristics of the adults in the 
survey.  As indicated in the table, almost 60 percent of the adults work and almost an equal per-
centage have household incomes of $30,000 or less.  We will refer to these households as lower-
income households.6  More than half (53%) of the surveyed population identified themselves as 
Latino and 33 percent as black non-Latinos.  Slightly more than one-third (37%) of the adults did 
not have a deposit account of any type.  In contrasting the data between the two cities, the most 
striking differences is the much greater representation of Latinos (63%) in Los Angeles, and the 
greater presence of younger individuals and individuals in the lowest income category in this 
city.    
                                                 
5 9.1% 
6 In 2000, the median household income in New York City was $39,939 and the median household income in Los Angeles was 
$35,955.   
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Table 1 
Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Survey Population in the OCC Survey 
(Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding, nonresponses, or the  
omitted category "other") 
 
Characteristics of the Survey Population % of  combined 
survey popula-
tion 
% of the NYC 
survey popula-
tion 
% of the LA 
survey popula-
tion 
Age    
18 to 29 years old 29.8 22.2 37.5 
30 to 64 years old 59.3 64.1 54.5 
65 or older 8.0 10.2 5.8 
    
Male 45.7 44.2 47.3 
    
Highest completed level of education    
Less than high school degree 37.8 36.1 39.5 
High school degree or equivalent 38.0 44.0 32.0 
More than high school 24.2 19.9 28.4 
    
Household composition    
No children in household 40.7 45.0 36.4 
One or two children  41.6 41.6 41.7 
Three or more children 17.5 13.3 21.8 
Other adults in household 81.6 75.0 88.2 
    
Housing status    
Rent home 75.3 88.7 61.8 
Own home 21.2 9.4 33.1 
    
Employment status & non-labor income    
Working full or part-time 57.7 54.7 60.7 
Not working 35.7 39.9 31.6 
Social security, veteran, or pension benefits 8.9 11.8 5.9 
Welfare, SSI, or food stamps 15.9 22.5 9.2 
No personal income in past year 8.6 7.7 9.5 
    
Household income in 1997     
$15,000 or below 24.2 33.6 14.8 
$15,001 to $30,000 32.5 31.3 33.8 
$30,001 to $45,000 24.6 18.7 30.6 
More than $45,000 18.6 16.3 20.9 
    
Self-reported race & ethnicity    
White non-Latino 7.9 5.6 10.3 
Black non-Latino 33.1 44.0 22.2 
Other non-Latino 3.6 4.7 2.5 
Latino 53.4 43.6 63.3 
    
Banking status    
No deposit account 36.9 42.2 31.6 
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A.  Who are the unbanked? 
 
Table 2 contrasts the characteristics of the unbanked individuals with the banked.  Recall that 
“banked” individuals need not literally use a bank.  They can have a deposit account at a bank, 
credit union, or thrift. 
 
 As shown in the table, the unbanked tend to be younger than the banked, they have less 
education and are much more likely to rent than to own their homes.  They are less likely to be 
working and they are much more likely to have low incomes.  They are more likely to identify 
themselves as Latino.  Finally, they are much less likely to have maintained any financial savings 
over the past year.  Presumably, individuals who had bank accounts but who answered that they 
had no financial savings drew their account balances down to near zero at the end of each pay 
period.  As we discuss later, the strong correlation between having financial savings and using a 
bank has led many policy analysts to focus on helping lower-income households to build savings 
as a way to bring them into the banking system.    
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Table 2 
Characteristics of Unbanked and Banked Households 
 
 Percentage 
among the 
banked 
Percentage 
among the 
unbanked 
Age   
18 to 29 years old 24.3 39.3 
30 to 64 years old 64.5 50.5 
65 or older 8.7 6.7 
   
Male 47.2 43.1 
   
Highest completed level of education   
Less than high school degree 27.0 56.2 
High school degree or equivalent 38.3 37.5 
More than high school 34.6 6.3 
   
Household composition   
No children in household 44.2 34.8 
One or two children  42.1 40.8 
Three or more children 13.6 24.2 
One or more other adults in household 80.6 83.3 
   
Housing status   
Rent home 66.5 90.3 
Own home 29.0 7.8 
   
Employment status & non-labor income   
Working full or part-time 68.9 38.5 
Not working 23.5 56.8 
Receive Soc. Security, veteran, or pension 
benefits 
10.0 6.9 
Receive welfare, SSI, or food stamps 6.1 32.6 
   
Household income in 1997    
$15,000 or below 12.2 44.9 
$15,001 to $30,000 31.7 34.0 
$30,001 to $45,000 30.2 15.1 
More than $45,000 25.9 6.0 
   
Self-reported race & ethnicity   
White non-Latino 11.6 1.6 
Black non-Latino 35.9 28.4 
Latino 45.1 60.5 
   
Did not maintain any financial savings over 
past year in bank, pension fund, money 
market, savings bond, etc 
25.4 86.3 
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B.  Where do the unbanked get financial services? 
 
 Individuals who do not use banks still need to obtain financial services.  If they have any 
financial savings, they need a means to safeguard their savings.  Even if they receive income in 
the form of a check, they need a means to convert the check into cash.  Finally, they many need 
to borrow periodically.  This subsection draws on the OCC survey data to examine where and 
how the unbanked obtain these financial services.   
 
 Table 3 presents data on the forms in which the unbanked keep financial savings and con-
trasts this with the banked.  As noted in Table 2 above, 86 percent of the unbanked said that they 
had no formal sector financial savings.  The OCC survey also asked about the use of informal 
means of financial savings, such as holding cash, money orders, uncashed checks, jewelry that 
can be sold, etc.  As shown in Table 3, 21 percent of the unbanked respondents said that they use 
such means and 16 percent of the banked did.  Allowing for both formal and informal means of 
financial savings, 69 percent of the unbanked had no financial savings and 22 percent of the 
banked had none.    
 
 
Table 3 
Use of informal savings methods 
 
 Percentage 
among the 
banked 
Percentage 
among the 
unbanked 
Kept savings in money orders, uncashed 
checks, cash, jewelry, loans to others, by 
participating in a savings circle, etc 
16.3 20.5 
Had neither informal financial savings 
nor formal sector financial savings  
21.9 68.6 
 
 
 Table 4 examines how people receive their incomes and convert that income into cash.  
Among banked individuals, 38 percent received an electronic deposit to their account, 49 percent 
received a check, and 6 percent were paid in cash.  Among the unbanked, 51 percent were paid 
by check, 19 percent were paid in cash, and 17 percent receive an electronic payment through a 
non-bank.  Almost all of the people in this latter category live in New York City where many 
check-cashing outlets (CCOs) participate in a network that allows them to distribute cash to peo-
ple who are paid electronically but who do not have bank accounts.  
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Table 4 
Forms of Income and Means of Converting Checks 
(Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding, nonresponses, or other factors) 
 
 Percentage 
among the 
banked 
Percentage 
among the un-
banked 
Way in which most income was received   
Direct deposit 37.7 0.0 
Check 48.7 50.5 
Cash 6.2 18.8 
Electronic transfer to non-bank 0.4 16.6 
None of these ways or no income 5.9 13.1 
   
Most common way to convert checks among 
those receiving checks 
  
Deposit check and take some cash back 43.6 0.0 
Deposit the entire check 34.6 0.0 
Cash the entire check 21.0 95.1 
Sign over check to family member or friend to cash 0.0 3.8 
   
Most common location for cashing checks 
(among those who cash checks) 
  
Bank 79.1 21.2 
Workplace 1.9 2.1 
Check cashing outlet 15.6 68.4 
Friend or family 0.0 1.9 
Supermarket 1.8 5.1 
 
People receiving a check must deposit it or cash it in order to convert it into a spendable 
form.  Among the banked, 78 percent generally deposit their checks or a part of the value of their 
checks and 21 percent generally just cash their checks.  Among the unbanked, 95 percent cash 
their checks.  There is also a striking difference in where people cashing their checks go to do so.  
Among the banked, 79 percent go to a bank and 16 percent to a check-cashing outlet (CCO).7  
There are a variety of reasons that individuals with bank accounts would cash their checks at 
CCOs.  If a customer’s bank account does not have sufficient funds to cover the check in case it 
is returned unpaid, many banks will not cash it.  They will instead insist that the individual de-
posit it and wait two to three days for it to clear before the banks will provide access to the funds.  
In addition, many individuals may wish to cash their checks, buy money orders, pay utility bills, 
and buy stamps and envelopes in which to mail payments --- and do this all in one location.  A 
typical CCO will handle all of these transactions.  A typical bank does not handle utility bill 
payments or sell stamps and envelopes.    
 
                                                 
7 A CCO is a non-depository financial institution that cashes peoples’ paychecks, sells money orders with which people pay bills, 
handles utility bill banks, and provides related services.  CCOs charge fees for these services.  States are the principal regulators 
of CCOs.  Some states, including New York and California, set ceilings on the fees that CCOs can charge.  Other states let the 
market determine CCO fees.  CCOs are common in New York City and Los Angeles, as they are in most urban areas.     
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Among unbanked individuals cashing checks, 21 percent mainly use banks, 68 percent 
use CCOs and 5 percent use grocery stores.  Undoubtedly, one of the explanations for the heavy 
reliance on CCOs is that many banks will not cash paychecks for non-depositors.  In addition, an 
individual cashing his or her check at a CCO can buy money orders, stamps, envelopes, and pay 
utility bills at that same location.   
 
 
Table 5 
Means of Paying Bills 
 
 Percentage 
among the 
banked  
Percentage 
among the  
unbanked 
Most common method of paying bills   
Check 63.3 0.0 
Money order 12.6 28.6 
Cash 10.4 36.4 
Bill payment service 1.9 6.5 
Automated payment from a bank account 0.8 0.0 
   
Location for purchase of most money orders   
Check cashing outlet 38.4 60.1 
Post office 34.7 19.8 
Supermarket 12.7 8.7 
Bank 8.4 2.6 
   
Location for accessing bill payment service   
CCO 83.0 84.9 
Bank 3.0 0.0 
Other 14.0 15.1 
 
  
 As indicated in Table 6, another payment that many lower-income urban households 
make is to transfer funds to family members living outside the U.S.  In the OCC survey, 20 per-
cent of the respondents indicated that they had made at least one such remittance over the past 
year.  Of those who did so, 45 percent wired the funds and 24 percent mailed a money order.  No 
other method accounted for over 5 percent of typical means of transferring the money.   
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Table 6 
International Remittances 
 
 Percentage  
Transferred money to someone living in an-
other country or in a U.S. territory within past 
year  
20.0 
  
Most frequent means used to transfer funds  
Wire the funds 44.8 
Mail a money order 23.8 
Carry the cash personally 4.5 
Bank-to-bank transfer 4.4 
Mail a check 3.7 
Use a courier 2.9 
Other 4.6 
 
 
 The households in the OCC survey reported using a variety of forms of consumer credit.  
As shown in Table 7, 56 percent of individuals with bank accounts had a major credit card but 
only 8 percent of those without banks accounts did.  When banked individuals looked for a loan, 
the largest percentage reported applying to a bank.  In the case of the unbanked, the largest per-
centage turned to a family member.  In terms of their use of nonbank forms of credit, 16 percent 
of the banked reported that they had obtained a credit card cash advance at some time in the pre-
vious 3 years, 10 percent had used a layaway plan to purchase a consumer good, and 5 percent 
had obtained a loan against their expected tax refund.  In the case of the unbanked, 10 percent 
reported that they had used a layaway plan and 4 percent had obtained a tax refund loan.  It is 
likely that the unbanked make much less use of bank loans and credit cards because they would 
not be able to pass traditional risk screening procedures.  Interestingly, when the OCC survey 
asked if the respondents could borrow $500 for 3 months if the need arose, 68 percent of the 
banked were confident that they could do so as were 51 percent of the unbanked.  This suggests 
that about a third of the banked and half of the unbanked in the survey are severely limited in 
their access to credit of any type.   
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Table 7 
Use of Consumer Credit 
 
 Percentage 
among the 
banked 
Percentage 
among the un-
banked 
Have a major credit card  55.9 7.8 
   
In past 3 years, looked for a loan from a:   
Bank 19.3 5.9 
Finance company 6.0 2.8 
Mortgage company 4.9 0.3 
Family member 6.7 16.6 
Friend 4.5 8.4 
Car dealer 6.5 2.3 
Retail store 1.7 1.9 
Individual who charges interest 0.7 0.4 
Payday lender 0.2 0 
   
In past 3 years, used a:   
Credit card cash advance 15.7 1.2 
Installment or layaway purchase plan 10.0 9.9 
Pawnshop 2.3 2.9 
Rapid tax refund 5.1 4.2 
Rent-to-own store 0.7 1.2 
Loan from a rotating credit society 0.3 0.3 
   
Could borrow $500 for 3 months if needed  67.7 50.5 
 
 
 A striking finding in Table 7 is the low percentages of individuals who reported that they 
used a pawnshop or payday lender.8  This is likely a misleading indication of the use of these 
credit sources in lower-income urban areas generally.  New York sets a severely binding interest 
rate ceiling on its pawnshops, so pawnshops in New York City are scarce and generally take only 
jewelry as collateral.  In addition, New York regulations do not permit payday lending to be 
profitable.  Although payday lenders were reasonably well-represented in Los Angeles in 1998, 
they have grown explosively in California and many other states since that time.  Undoubtedly, a 
contemporary survey would find much heavier use of payday lenders than is suggested by the 
OCC survey.   
 
                                                 
8 Payday loan offices commonly make two-week loans for amounts between $100 and $500.  Typically, the borrower needs an 
advance to meet expenses until his or her next payday.  At the time of the advance, the borrower writes a personal check to the 
lender who agrees not to submit it for payment until the borrower’s next payday at which time the borrower’s account will pre-
sumably have sufficient funds to pay the check.  Frequently, borrowers choose not to repay the loan at the next payday and in-
stead renew it.  In this way, a two-week loan can become a six- to eight-week loan.   
 
There were very few payday loan offices in the country prior to 1995, but by 2003 there were well over 10,000.  Many 
belong to large chains that operate across multiple states.  Some payday lenders also function as check-cashing outlets but others 
dedicate themselves only to payday lending.   
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 Payday loans are only available to banked individuals since, in a traditional payday loan, 
a customer writes a personal check made out to the lender.  The lender agrees to hold the check 
for about two weeks before depositing it.  In exchange, the payday lender advances a cash pay-
ment to the customer that is somewhat less than the amount of the check.  The difference, which 
is the “finance charge,” in combination with the maturity of the loan determines the annualized 
interest rate.  In the states where payday lending thrives, lenders typically charge $15 to $25 for 
each $100 that they advance.  That is, in a typical transaction, a borrower might write a check for 
$235 that the lender agrees to hold for two weeks and the lender would provide the borrower 
with a $200 cash advance.  The annualized interest rate on such a loan is 455 percent. 
 
 Prior to the maturity of the loan, the borrower can pay the lender the face value of the 
check in cash, extinguishing the debt and concluding the transaction.  If the borrower does not 
repay the loan by its maturity, the lender may deposit the check.  Assuming that the check clears, 
the loan is fully repaid and the transaction is complete.  If a borrower does not want to repay a 
loan at maturity, or cannot, a lender will frequently allow the borrower to renew the loan by 
“rolling it over”.  In a rollover, the borrower pays the lender the finance charge due at maturity 
and the lender agrees to hold the check for another specified period of time.   
 
 Survey data (Caskey 2002) indicate that most payday loan customers are not officially 
poor.  Rather they belong to moderate-income households, with incomes between $18,000 and 
$50,000, but they struggle to pay their bills on time.  The vast majority of payday loan customers 
do not have access to convenient lower-cost credit from mainstream lenders because they have 
severely impaired credit histories or because they have reached the limit of the credit lines these 
lenders are willing to extend.    
 
 
C.  Why don’t the unbanked use banks? 
 
 A number of surveys have sought to answer the question: Why don’t the unbanked use 
banks?  In almost all of these surveys, unbanked individuals respond most frequently that they 
don’t need a bank account because they have no month-to-month savings to safeguard.  This re-
sponse is also consistent with the OCC findings, discussed above, regarding the financial savings of 
the unbanked.  Generally, the second and third most frequently cited explanations are bank mini-
mum balance requirements and bank fees.  But these too are related to a household’s level of sav-
ings since minimum balance requirements will generally not be binding on individuals able to 
maintain about $100 of month-to-month financial savings.  In addition, low balances in an account 
frequently trigger many bank fees, such as monthly account fees and bounced check fees.  
 
 Other reasons that people give to explain why they do not have a deposit account include 
concerns about privacy, a lack of comfort interacting with banks, language barriers and banks not 
letting them open accounts.   People who banks do not permit to open accounts likely have histories 
of writing bad checks, have severely impaired credit records, or do not have required identification.  
People who say that they do not open an account out of a desire for privacy may have a number of 
concerns, including:  
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• fear that a creditor might seize the savings of a delinquent debtor;  
• fear that a former spouse might seize the savings of an individual behind on his child-
support payments; 
• fear that welfare eligibility would be threatened by a substantial account balance or by a his-
tory of deposits from under-the-table earnings;  
• a desire to hide earnings from the tax authorities; or 
• fear that a bank might report suspected illegal immigrants to the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service or that the INS could use bank records to discover their presence.   
• Interestingly, the least important reasons people give for being unbanked are the hours and 
locations of bank branches.  
 
The OCC survey was typical of other surveys in the way that it investigated why people 
did not to have bank accounts.  In the OCC survey, if a person did not have an account, the sur-
veyor read a list of possible reasons to explain the lack of an account and asked the respondent to 
choose the main reasons that applied to him or her.  For our purposes, however, there are two 
problems with the data.  First, the most common reasons found in other surveys – the person did 
not want an account because he or she had no savings – was not included as a possible choice.  
Second, the public data set excluded the responses of people who selected such reasons as:  the 
bank would not let them open an account, their bank account could be frozen by a creditor, or 
they thought that they would need a Social Security card to open an account.   
 
Despite these shortcomings, the OCC data are still broadly consistent with the findings of 
other surveys.  As shown in Table 8, the two most common reasons that people cited from this 
list of possible reasons are the lack of money necessary to open an account and bank fees.  But 
58 percent of the unbanked indicated that none of the listed reasons were important to them.  
This is consistent with the finding from other surveys where the most common reason people 
give for not having an account is that they do not have any savings, a response that was not pos-
sible in the OCC survey.  Interestingly, in the OCC survey 77 percent of the unbanked said that 
they were aware that some banks had “basic” checking accounts with low minimum balance re-
quirements, low fees, and a small number of monthly free checks.  And 63 percent of the un-
banked indicated that they had never had a bank account.  This is much higher than is commonly 
found in other surveys, and may reflect the much higher percentage of Hispanic individuals in 
the sample areas compared to the sample areas of other surveys.      
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Table 8 
Why Don’t People Have Bank Accounts? 
 
 Percentage 
among the un-
banked 
What are the main reasons why you do not have a bank account?  
Do not have the amount of money banks require to open an account 25.0% 
Bank fees are too high 16.5 
Are not quite sure how to open an account 6.7 
Banks hold checks for too long 2.3 
Banks are not located conveniently 2.6 
Banks are not open when you need to use them 2.1 
Most bank staff only speak English 1.5 
None of the reasons listed above 57.9 
  
Which bank fees are too high? (among those citing bank fees as a barrier)  
Monthly account fee 55.4% 
Bounced check fee 29.8 
Per check fee 21.8 
Fee for use of "foreign" ATMs 16.9 
Annual fee for ATM card 4.7 
Other fee 24.2 
  
Have heard of "basic" checking accounts that charge low fees, set low minimum 
balance requirements, and permit you to write a limited number of free checks 76.6 
  
Have never had a bank account 63.3 
 
 
 Because of the shortcomings of the OCC survey regarding the reasons that people do not 
have a bank account, we include the results from one other survey that addressed the same issue.  
In a 1996 survey of 900 lower-income urban households, Caskey (1997) asked households with-
out deposit accounts, why they do not have an account.  He provided respondents with a list of 
possible reasons from which they could select one or more.  They could also provide a reason 
that was not on the list.  As shown in Table 6, 53 percent of the respondents cited "don't need 
account because we have no savings" as a reason, making this the most frequent reason cited; 
another 45 percent cited bank fees or minimum balance requirements. 
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Table 9 
Reasons Given in Caskey Survey for 
Why Households Do Not Have Deposit Accounts 
 
Reason/reasons given for why households do not  
have deposit accounts 
Percentage 
Giving this 
Reason 
Don't need account because I have no savings 53.3 
Bank account fees are too high or banks require too  
much money to open or maintain an account 
45.2 
I want to keep my financial records private 21.6 
Not comfortable dealing with banks  17.6 
Banks won't let us open an account  9.5 
No bank has convenient hours or location 8.5 
Source:  Caskey (1997) 
 
 
 As discussed earlier, large percentages of lower-income urban residents see themselves as 
having severely limited access to credit or turn to non-bank lenders, such as finance companies or 
payday loan shops.  Although the OCC survey did not examine why people lack access to bank 
credit, other data support the conclusion that the main reason that people are excluded from bank 
credit is that they have impaired credit histories or, in some cases, no credit histories.  In addition, 
many households have reached the limit of the credit that banks are willing to extend them.  
 
 A comparatively large percentage of lower-income and minority households report a history 
of failing to fulfill payment obligations on time, heavy debt-payment burdens, bankruptcy, or liens 
placed on their property.  For example, Fair Isaac and Company Inc., one of the largest U.S. credit 
scoring bureaus, reported that it examined loan application data from "tens of thousands" of indi-
viduals applying for installment loans between July 1992 and December 1994 (Martell et al).  Us-
ing its proprietary data base, Fair Isaac assigned scores for each applicant ranging from 0 to 240, 
with a higher score indicating a lower credit risk.  The report (p. 14) notes that, “Many lenders set 
their cutoff score – the score…below which they decline applicants – around 200.”  The study 
found that that 54 percent of low- and moderate-income individuals (defined in the study as indi-
viduals with annual incomes under $21,000 a year) had scores below 200, but only 33 percent of 
individuals with incomes over this amount had scores below this level.  Similarly, the Freddie Mac 
Corporation (1999), a large government-sponsored housing enterprise, conducted a survey of 
20,000 households with incomes under $75,000.  The survey focused on the households' credit his-
tories and financial behaviors.  It classified a household as having a "bad" credit record if the 
household reported that: 
 
• it had been at least 90 days late on a payment in the previous two years,  
• it had been 30 days late on a payment more than once in the previous two years, or if  
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• it had a record of bankruptcy or liens files on its property due to payment delinquencies.   
 
 As shown in Table 10, by these criteria a substantially higher percentage of lower-income 
households have bad credit records that would likely exclude them from prime loans than do 
higher-income households.  In addition, substantially higher percentages of African-American and 
Hispanic respondents had bad credit records than did white respondents.   
 
Table 10 
Incidences of Impaired Credit Records 
 
Family characteristic Percentage 
with "bad" 
credit 
Record 
Percentage 
with "good" credit
record 
Percentage 
with 
insufficient informa
tion 
to classify 
All families 30 57 13 
    
Income (1998 dollars)    
Less than 25,000 36 No data reported No data reported 
25,000-49,999 33 No data reported No data reported 
50,000-64,999 25 No data reported No data reported 
65,000-75,000 22 No data reported No data reported 
    
Race or ethnicity of respondent    
African-American 48 36 16 
Hispanic 34 51 15 
White 27 61 12 
Source:  Freddie Mac Corporation (1999) 
 
 
 In a national household survey conducted in 2001, the Federal Reserve found a similar pat-
tern linking household incomes to indicators of credit risk.  As shown in Table 11, lower-income 
households were much more likely to have such indicators than were higher income families.   
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Table 11 
Indicators of Debt Burdens and Debt Payment Difficulties 
 
Families ranked  
by income  
 
Percentage with 
ratio of  debt payments 
to family income above 
40 percent 
Percentage with a 
debt payment late 
60 days or more in 
previous year 
Lowest 20% 27.0 13.4 
20-39.9% 16.0 11.7 
40-59.9% 11.7 7.9 
60-79.9% 5.6 4.0 
80-89.9% 3.5 2.6 
90-100% 2.0 1.3 
Source:  2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (Aizcorbe et al, 2003) 
 
 The strong link between household income and indicators of credit risk should not be sur-
prising.  After all, since many lower-income households have no financial savings, any economic 
disruption, such as a health crisis in the family, a job termination, etc, can force a family to put off 
non-essential expenditures, including debt service obligations.  In addition, there is a strong correla-
tion between household education and income.  If education is linked to money management skills 
or to an awareness of the benefits of a good credit record, this may also partly explain the correla-
tion between household income and indicators of credit risk.   
 
 An impaired credit record does not necessarily shut one off from credit.  Mainstream lend-
ers will extend loans to people with somewhat impaired credit histories or with fairly heavy debt 
burdens, but they commonly increase the interest rate on the loans to reflect the increased risk.  If 
an individual has a more seriously impaired credit history or heavier debt burden than mainstream 
lenders will accept, the individual can often borrow from “subprime” lenders, many of which are 
subsidiaries of mainstream prime lenders.  Subprime lending is generally a separate business from 
prime lending because the business practices of the subprime lenders can differ substantially from 
those of the prime.  Subprime lending frequently involves much more person-to-person contact and 
much faster responses when a borrower falls behind on a scheduled payment.  Individuals with se-
riously impaired credit histories or very heavy debt burdens can even lose access to the subprime 
market.  At this point, if they need credit, they can turn to pawnshops, payday lenders, or rent-to-
own operations that do not pull traditional credit reports.9  A pawnshop will lend to anyone since 
the loan is based only on the value of the collateral that the customer leaves in the possession of the 
pawnbroker.  A payday lender will lend to almost anyone who has a checking account in good 
standing, recent steady employment, and who has not failed to honor a previous payday loan.  
Rent-to-own stores will also implicitly provide credit for the purchase of furniture and other con-
sumer goods because the stores retain legal ownership of the goods, making repossession in the 
case of missed payments much simpler.   
  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 One might call such institutions, “sub-subprime” lenders.  
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D. What is the problem with being unbanked? 
 
One major problem with being not having a bank account or not having access to bank 
credit is that the alternatives tend to be significantly more expensive.  Most check-cashing out-
lets, for example, charge two to three percent of the face value of a paycheck to cash it.10  They 
also levy fees for money orders, stamps and envelopes, and for handling utility bill payments.  
This means that a household with $20,000 in take-home income that regularly uses a CCO for all 
of its payment services can easily spend $600 year on just payment services.  Were the same 
household consistently able to meet a bank’s minimum balance requirements and not bounce any 
checks, it would almost always pay less than $100 a year in bank fees, and often substantially 
less.  Such a difference can make a noticeable impact in the standard of living of low- and mod-
erate-income households whose budgets are already stretched to pay for household necessities.   
 
Similar cost differences arise in the case of bank credit versus the credit of lenders that 
serve mainly high-risk borrowers.  Pawnshop interest rates are regulated by states, not the federal 
government.  In states where pawnshops thrive, they generally charge annualized interest rates of 
150 percent or more on typical loans of around $100.  Payday lenders, which have become more 
numerous than pawnshops, are also regulated by the states.  In the states where payday lenders 
are common, the lenders charge annualized interest rates of 300 to 500 percent on typical loans.  
Small loan finance companies, which make somewhat larger loans and refuse to accept very high 
risk customers, typically change annualized interest rates of 50 to 100 percent.  Annualized inter-
est rates on bank credit cards are have generally hovered between 18 and 25 percent in recent 
years.  Households that must borrow in the alternative financial sector because of impaired credit 
histories or heavy debt burdens, pay a substantial penalty for their status.  When these are lower-
income households who already struggle economically, this compounds their problems.   
 
Interestingly, in an ethnographic study conducted by Caskey et al (1997) among lower-
income households in a large city and in a small town, the researchers found that the unbanked 
did not complain about the cost of payment or credit services.  Rather, they complained most 
about the personal stress of living paycheck to paycheck without easy access to credit.  They 
fully expected that minor or major personal financial setbacks, such as a required automobile re-
pair, a large health care expense, or an employment interruption, were coming their way as such 
setbacks had in the past.  They said that they worried constantly about this because their credit 
histories and complete lack of savings turned every such set back into a very stressful personal 
financial crisis.  The stress associated with their situation may, in fact, be the major problem of 
being unbanked and of lacking access to bank credit.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 This is not true in New York City.  New York law set a maximum check-cashing fee of 1.4%.  Most states do not limit check-
cashing fees and, among those that do, few set a maximum rate below 2.5%.   
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E. Policy initiatives aimed at helping the unbanked 
 
 Agencies and legislators of the federal and state governments have long expressed con-
cern that millions of lower-income households are unbanked and millions are excluded from 
bank credit.  They have pursued and are pursuing a wide range of initiatives to lower the cost of 
financial services for the poor and to bring more of the poor into the banking system.  Some pri-
vate sector institutions, both for-profit and not-for-profit, have also launched initiatives of their 
own.  This subsection of the paper reviews these initiatives.  In doing so, it divides them into 
four categories.  First are initiatives that focus on making banking services more convenient and 
affordable for a larger segment of lower-income households.  Second are initiatives that seek to 
lower the cost or improve the quality of the non-bank financial services often used by lower-
income households.  Third are initiatives that seek to change those characteristics of the un-
banked that may leave them dependent on higher-cost non-bank financial service providers.  Fi-
nally, there are initiatives intended to develop new financial service products that may better 
meet the needs of unbanked households or that may lower the fees that these households pay for 
basic financial services.   
 
Before reviewing the initiatives aimed specifically at broadening the coverage of banking ser-
vices for the poor, it is worthwhile noting that banking in the United States has historically been 
widely dispersed in geographical terms. Branch banking was heavily regulated through the first 
half of the 2oth century and interstate banks were illegal through the its first three quarters. As a 
result, the U.S. currently counts on a far greater banking presence – with some 10,000 banking 
institutions versus the forty counted in Mexico.  Furthermore, given the difficulties of spreading 
out geographically, U.S.banks have traditionally drawn intensely on their local community for 
clients.  
 
 
Initiatives targeting deposit-taking financial institutions 
 
 In 1977, the federal government enacted the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).  The 
main intent of the CRA was to ensure that banks provide home mortgages in all of the communi-
ties from which they gather deposits.   The CRA was passed in response to concerns that many 
banks, in their lending decisions, consciously or unconsciously discriminated against lower-
income communities and communities with high percentages of racial and ethnic minorities.  In 
addition, there were concerns that bank branches were largely absent from many lower-income 
urban communities.  Bankers, in some cases, agreed with this latter point, but emphasized that it 
was difficult to serve a lower-income population profitably.  They argued that deposit balances 
are low, transactions are numerous, and loan opportunities are limited.   Some community activ-
ists countered that the absence of the banks reflected preconceived notions rather than truly lim-
ited profit opportunities. 
 
Over time, the CRA has been revised substantially.  As of this writing, banks undergo an 
annual, or less frequent, CRA examination.  The examiners give the banks one of four possible 
CRA ratings:  outstanding, satisfactory, needs improvement, and substantial noncompliance.  
These ratings are based on a bank’s performance in three areas: its record of lending (primarily 
home mortgages and small business lending) in the communities from which it gathers deposits, 
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its investments in community development projects, and its delivery of retail banking services in 
its market area.  The last category is the one that concerns us here.  A bank’s service rating de-
pends on its geographic distribution of branches and its record of opening and closing branches, 
especially branches in low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities.  The rating also depends 
on other community development services or service delivery mechanisms that the bank may 
offer that benefit low- and moderate-income individuals.   
 
 The point of the service test is to pressure banks and thrifts to open or maintain branches 
in LMI communities and to offer products, such as low-cost basic checking accounts, or services, 
such as consumer education efforts, that benefit LMI individuals.  That said, it must be admitted 
that the pressure is very light.  For one, there is no immediate consequence for a bank that re-
ceives a CRA rating below “satisfactory.”  Regulators simply take into consideration a bank’s 
CRA rating when the bank must seek regulatory approval for future actions, such as a bank 
merger.  Even then, the bank’s CRA record is only one of several factors that regulators consider 
in granting approvals.  Beyond this, a bank’s service record is one of three criteria that examiners 
use in determining a bank’s overall CRA record, and it gets a weighting of 25 percent, not 33 
percent.  Finally, as Michael Stegman and Robert Faris (2001) point out, the standards for the 
service test are vague, so almost all banks receive a satisfactory rating or better in this area.   
 
  In addition to the CRA, there have been periodic legislative efforts to mandate that banks 
offer low-cost basic checking accounts.  A few states have passed such laws, but the federal gov-
ernment has not.  While the bank trade associations have opposed these laws, they have called on 
their members to offer such accounts voluntarily, and a majority of banks claim that they do.  
Periodically, members of Congress have proposed that credit unions, which are not subject to the 
CRA, also be evaluated based on their service to LMI communities.  The main credit union trade 
association has vigorously opposed this, but at the same time it and the federal regulator of credit 
unions have encouraged credit unions to reach out to LMI communities.  In 1998, the regulatory 
agency for federal credit unions made it relatively easy for credit unions to make residents of 
LMI communities eligible for membership.  But one recent study found that the mainstream 
credit unions in Chicago serve relatively few lower-income households (Jacob et al, 2002). 
 
In 1999, the U.S. Treasury Department launched a major effort to pay all federal benefit 
payments, such as social security benefits, electronically.  One impediment to this initiative was 
the large number of benefit recipients without bank accounts.  As a result, the Treasury urged 
banks to offer Electronic Transfer Accounts (ETAs).  The Treasury offered to pay banks $12.60 
for each ETA account they established for benefit recipients, and the Treasury specified a mini-
mum set of characteristics that these accounts must meet.  The accounts could not cost account 
owners more than $3 a month, they could levy no fee for electronic deposits coming from the 
federal government, they could have no minimum balance requirement, and they had to permit 
four free cash withdrawals per month.  Although hundreds of banks, thrifts, and credit unions 
agreed to offer the accounts, usage rates are very low.  Most recipients, who currently receive 
their benefits by check and cash the checks at a check-cashing outlet or grocery store, probably 
see no benefit to the account.  Even if they had an ETA account, they would still need to pur-
chase money orders, stamps, and envelopes to pay bills, and they can do this in one stop at a 
check-cashing outlet and at many grocery stores.   
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Finally, some government agencies and philanthropic organizations have provided finan-
cial support to credit unions and banks that have, as a main goal, promoting the economic devel-
opment of LMI communities.  Such banks, credit unions, and venture capital firms are generi-
cally known as community development financial institutions (CDFIs).  Some are organized as 
not-for-profit institutions and others as for-profit, but to be classified as a CDFI a for-profit or-
ganization must be willing to limit its profits in order to achieve community development goals.   
 
CDFIs have been around for decades, but most started in the 1980s and 1990s.  During 
this time, many policy makers and community activists promoted the idea that access to financ-
ing was a major barrier to the economic development of LMI communities.  Philanthropic or-
ganizations, such as the Ford Foundation, backed financial institutions that committed to make 
special efforts to provide financial services in LMI communities.  In addition, in 1994 the federal 
government created the CDFI Fund in the U.S. Treasury Department.  Between its founding and 
late-2003, it has provided $534 million in financial support to certified CDFI financial institu-
tions.  The vast majority of these funds have gone to CDFIs that provide mainly financing for 
housing and business, but some of it has subsidized or capitalized banks and credit unions that 
focus on providing basic consumer financial services.  It would be fair to say, however, that 
CDFIs that emphasize the provision of basic consumer financial services to LMI communities 
have had a very small impact nationally.  The institutions are relatively few in number and most 
are small and serve hundreds or a few thousand households in an urban area, not tens of thou-
sands.   
 
In addition, the performance of CDFIs has not supported the views of those community 
activists who argued that traditional banking institutions could be profitable while serving a pre-
dominantly LMI community.  Some CDFIs are profitable, but most require ongoing explicit or 
implicit subsidies.  There are no formal studies of the banks and credit unions that manage to 
earn profits while serving predominantly LMI communities, but anecdotal evidence suggests that 
they deviate from traditional banks in a number of ways.  First, they work hard to keep their op-
erating costs low.  Their branches have low-cost furnishings and are often located in low-rent 
buildings, frequently the former branch offices of banks that withdrew from deteriorating com-
munities.  Staff salaries, especially for top management, are well below those found in traditional 
banks.  Second, the front-line staff, such as tellers and even the top managers, dress and commu-
nicate in ways that make the LMI customers comfortable.  In other words, they either belong to 
the community they serve or make an effort to belong.  Third, the institutions raise as many large 
deposits from outside of the community as they can.  This is an implicit subsidy.  That is, the 
community development banks and credit unions ask churches, foundations, local governments, 
mainstream banks, and others to deposit up to $100,000 (the maximum covered by federal de-
posit insurance).  The CDFIs offer a below-market interest rate on the deposits and invest the 
funds in market-yielding instruments.  The earnings support the operations of the CDFIs.  These 
institutions make the deposits because they support the community development goals of the 
CDFIs and, in the case of banks, because they receive CRA credit for doing so.   
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Initiatives targeting non-bank alternatives 
 
In addition to efforts to push banks to serve lower-income households or to subsidize and 
capitalize those that make special efforts to do so, many policy initiatives have focused on the 
non-bank financial institutions that serve LMI households.  The initiatives have sought to reduce 
the costs associated with using the non-bank institutions and improve the quality of their ser-
vices.  Specifically, numerous state governments have imposed price controls on the fees or in-
terest rates that check-cashing outlets, pawnshops, payday lenders, and others can levy for their 
services.  In addition, many state governments require these alternative financial institutions to 
clearly post their fees, and have made it easy for their customers to file service complaints with 
state agencies.   
 
These state regulations on the fees and interest rates charged the non-bank financial insti-
tutions are highly controversial.  On one side, the advocates claim that there is some market fail-
ure, such as the monopoly power of the financial institutions or an inability of their customers to 
understand the fees or interest rates, which justifies the price controls.  Opponents argue that 
there is no evidence of general monopoly power.  Indeed, entry barriers for these non-bank fi-
nancial service providers are relatively low.  In addition, the opponents of fee regulations ac-
knowledge that many LMI customers may not understand annualized interest rates, but they ar-
gue that the customers do understand the dollar costs of their transactions and all other relevant 
aspects of the transactions.  Unlike home mortgages, payday loans, pawn loans, or check cashing 
transactions have simple-to-understand terms.  Finally the opponents to regulation emphasize 
that low ceilings on permissible fees or interest rates will simply drive marginal non-bank finan-
cial institutions out of business.  There are, for example, no payday lenders operating in states 
where they are not able to charge annualized interest rates over 100 percent.  The opponents of 
regulation argue that the absence of the non-bank financial institutions that serve LMI house-
holds pushes those households to less-desirable alternatives.   
 
International remittances between U.S. residents and residents in Mexico and a few other 
countries is one area in which there has undoubtedly been progress in lowering the cost of non-
bank financial services.  In the late 1990s, most U.S. residents who sent typical remittances of 
$200 to $300, paid $20 to $25 for each transfer.  In addition, the transfer was often made using 
an exchange rate that deviated substantially from market rates and the recipient frequently had to 
pay an additional fee upon receipt of the funds.  The Mexican government brought attention to 
these high costs and, in the U.S., lawsuits were filed against the largest money transmitters over 
their hidden and unfavorable exchange rates.  At the same time, increasing numbers of banks and 
credit unions in the U.S. established partnerships with Mexican counterparts to handle the remit-
tance business.  The increased competition and the pressures brought upon the traditional trans-
mitters to cut their fees and make their exchange rates more transparent have reduced 
U.S./Mexico remittance costs substantially.  In 1999, Western Union, for example, charged $20 
for transferring $200 to Mexico.  In 2001, it charged $15 and many banks and credit unions have 
even lower charges (Orozco, 2002).         
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Initiatives targeting the unbanked 
 
 The third group of public- and private-sector initiatives focuses on the unbanked house-
holds themselves.  In broad terms, these initiatives provide consumer financial education, seek to 
alter consumer spending behaviors, or provide increased incentives for LMI households to build 
financial savings.   
 
Many non-profit organizations and government agencies sponsor consumer education 
programs targeting LMI adults (Braustein and Welch, 2002).  These sponsors often argue that 
one of the reasons that large numbers of LMI households use high-cost payment or credit ser-
vices is because they are not aware of lower-cost alternatives or are not comfortable using the 
lower-cost alternatives.  The educational programs seek to correct these deficiencies.  Typical 
curricula teach adult students to compare, for example, the relative cost of payday loans versus 
bank loans, the cost of a rent-to-own purchase versus a simple purchase financed with a credit 
card, and the cost of using a check-cashing outlet versus maintaining a checking account.  The 
courses frequently teach the students how to balance a check book, how to open a bank account, 
and even take them to visit a bank and practice the skills in order to make them feel comfortable 
using the banking system.  Often, banks help support such educational efforts, and receive CRA 
credit for doing so.   
 
Although such courses are common, there are no high-quality studies of their effective-
ness (Hilgert and Hogarth, 2003).  Most reports are based on simple before-and-after studies, 
meaning that the program sponsor reports how many of the course participants had banks ac-
counts, to cite one example, prior to the course and how many did so afterwards.  Standard im-
pact assessments do not examine the persistence over time in the new behaviors.  In addition, 
since these studies lack a control group, it is hard to discern the effect of the education from the 
self-motivation of the course participants.  In any case, the data reviewed above suggest that the 
impact of such educational efforts on rates of account ownership or use of high-cost lenders is 
likely to be modest.  Most people using check-cashing outlets, payday lenders, etc., are aware 
that these are more costly alternatives, but they do so because of the convenience of the payment 
services and because their credit histories and debt burdens prevent them from patronizing 
lower-cost sources of credit.   
 
A second, and sometimes overlapping, set of initiatives tries to teach LMI households 
methods that they can use to build savings.  Motivating these efforts is the belief that inadequate 
savings are a major barrier to account ownership, are highly correlated with an inability to pay 
bills on time, and are a source of substantial personal stress.  Educational efforts that try to help 
LMI households build savings generally involve a detailed analysis of their spending patterns 
intended to identify unnecessary expenses and a discussion of behavioral “tricks” that many peo-
ple use to limit their spending.  These tricks can include immediately setting aside income from a 
paycheck into a separate savings fund (“pay yourself first”), never using a credit or debit card for 
purchases, and limiting the amount of cash that one carries for impulse purchases.  As in the case 
of educational efforts focused on conveying knowledge about alternative financial services, there 
are no fully satisfactory studies documenting that these behavioral modification efforts signifi-
cantly affect savings, credit histories, or the use of banks among the LMI households to complete 
the courses.  One quasi-experimental study (Staten et al, 2002) did find that one-on-one credit 
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counseling had a positive and sustained impact on indicators of the recipients’ credit risk pro-
files.  Such results are encouraging, because the data reviewed above gives strong support to the 
notion that a lack of savings and impaired credit histories are the critical barriers preventing 
many LMI households from lowering the cost of their payment and credit services.    
 
A related third initiative supported by foundations and government agencies has sought to 
build the savings of LMI households by increasing their incentives to save.  Since the late-1990s, 
several non-profit organizations partnered with banks and credit unions to create “Individual De-
velopment Accounts,” known as IDAs.  IDAs are special savings accounts open only to qualify-
ing LMI individuals.  Using funds supplied by a philanthropic foundation or government agency, 
the non-profit group offered to match the qualifying savings put into the IDA account by an IDA 
participant.  Match rates vary across IDA programs but typically range from $1 for each dollar 
saved to as high as $3 for each dollar saved.  To be eligible for matching, generally the funds 
must be withdrawn only to pay for education, the down payment on a home, to start a business, 
or to support oneself in retirement.   
 
Several ideas motivated the creation of IDAs (Sherraden, 1991).  One was the observa-
tion that most incentives to save in the U.S. come from federal and state income tax exemptions 
which bring little benefit to LMI households since they face low marginal income tax rates.  An-
other motivation was the observation that people tend to build savings by putting them into 
forms that are costly to liquidate quickly, such a pension funds or equity in a house.  A third mo-
tivation was the claim that anti-poverty programs in the U.S. give too much emphasis to peoples’ 
incomes and not enough emphasis to their wealth.  Proponents of IDAs argue that ownership of 
assets makes one more forward–looking and increases the likelihood that one will become civi-
cally engaged.   
 
A number of foundations sponsored an evaluation of 13 IDA programs (Schreiner et al, 
2002), but the results are inconclusive.  Of the LMI individuals who volunteered to participate in 
IDA programs, 56% saved a net of $100 or more over an average participation period of two 
years.  The average net savings among all participants was $528.  Unfortunately, since the report 
does not include a random assignment study, one cannot separate the incentive effect of the IDA 
from the self-motivation effect.  Presumably, people who are motivated to save sign up for IDAs.  
In addition, the administrative costs of the IDA programs in the study exceeded the net amount 
of money that the participants saved (Sherraden, 2000).  These costs could undoubtedly be low-
ered by cutting staffing devoted to the programs but there is no indication that low-cost IDA pro-
grams would result in similar levels of saving.   
 
Philanthropic foundations and government agencies have also supported the efforts of 
some non-profit groups to build the wealth of LMI households through microenterprise devel-
opment.  But, in the U.S., these programs have remained very small scale and have been plagued 
by very high administrative costs.  In addition, most studies find that they have done little to 
raise participants’ incomes.  While microenterprise may have had impressive results in low-
income countries, there are serious doubts that it can be effective in the U.S. context (Schreiner 
and Woller, 2003).    
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Initiatives to develop new financial institutions or products tailored to the unbanked 
 
 The final set of outreach initiatives underway in the U.S. focuses on altering the tradi-
tional products or delivery channels for basic financial services to better meet the needs of many 
LMI households.  These initiatives also look to new technologies to lower the costs of delivering 
traditional payment and credit services to unbanked households.  These initiatives are largely 
private-sector efforts.  Some have been modestly subsidized by foundation grants or other 
means, but many have received no subsidies at all.11   
 
 Several initiatives are based on banks or credit unions offering the traditional services of 
a check-cashing outlet along with traditional banking services.  In some cases, the banks form 
partnerships with check-cashing outlets to deliver the combined services.  There are several ra-
tionales for this approach.  First is the recognition that many unbanked individuals see little need 
for banks’ savings services, but they do need payment services.  Banks can earn additional in-
come by selling the payment services to unbanked individuals.  This can help support a branch in 
a LMI community that might otherwise be uneconomical.  Equally importantly, it will bring the 
unbanked into the branch and make them comfortable interacting with a bank and give the bank 
an opportunity to market savings products to those who might be interested.  If the bank forms a 
partnership with a check-cashing outlet (CCO) and uses the CCO to deliver consumer banking 
services, this to can lower its operating costs in the LMI community and provide more conven-
ient banking services to many LMI households.   
 
The best known of the bank/CCO hybrid models is the Cash & Save division of Union 
Bank of California.  This large bank opened 13 non-traditional bank branches displaying the 
name Cash & Save in a variety of settings where high numbers of LMI households walk or drive 
by. These branches are small and look more like a CCO than a bank.  They offer the full range of 
CCO services as well as traditional consumer banking services.  The branches have been finan-
cially successful and Union Bank claims that about 40 percent of its check-cashing customers 
have begun to use one or more traditional bank products.12   
 
Another such model that has received substantial attention is the partnership between a 
check-cashing firm, RiteCheck, in New York City and a credit union, Bethex Federal Credit Un-
ion.  RiteCheck operates 11 CCOs in the City and Bethex has five full-service branches.  
Through the partnership, Bethex depositors can obtain all of the traditional payment services at a 
RiteCheck outlet as well as make deposits or obtain cash withdrawals from their accounts.  This 
enables Bethex to provide basic banking services though the CCOs at a fraction of the cost of 
maintaining a full-service branch.  RiteCheck earns fees from handling the deposits and with-
drawals on behalf of Bethex.13   
 
 In addition to the bank/CCO hybrid model, several banks, including some very large 
banks, have redesigned the account that they suggest unbanked individuals first begin to use.  As 
                                                 
11 The Treasury Department in the last year of the Clinton Administration launched the “First Acounts Initiative.”  Funded with 
$10 million, it provided financial support to depository institutions that were making innovative efforts to bring the unbanked 
into the banking system.  Under the Bush Administration this initiative stopped, and there were no reports issued on the success 
that the institutions that were funded had with their efforts.      
12 For more information on the Union Bank model, see the report by Richter and Tan (2002).   
13 The report by Richter and Tan (2002) has more details on this partnership.   
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discussed above, advocates for the unbanked urged banks to offer basic checking accounts, a 
low-cost checking account with low minimum balance requirements and a specified minimum 
number of free checks per month.  While this account was suitable for some of the unbanked 
who wished to open a bank account, it was not suitable for all.  For one, many of the unbanked 
who had previously had a checking account were forced to close those accounts because they 
overdrew their accounts and did not promptly return the accounts to a positive balance.  Banks 
not only closed their accounts, but they also commonly reported them to “ChexSystem,” a net-
work owned by member banks and credit unions that contribute information on mishandled 
checking and savings accounts to a centralized database.  Most other banks will refuse to open 
checking accounts for people whose names are in ChexSystem.  In addition, even among those 
unbanked individuals who can open a checking account, many may not want to for fear of the 
fees that they will incur if they overdraw their accounts.  Most banks charge $20 to $30 for each 
“non-sufficient funds” (NSF) check, and the merchants that receive the checks traditionally im-
pose a $10 to $15 returned check charge.  For an individual living from paycheck to paycheck, it 
is easy to overdraw a checking account at the end of a pay period.  This can make a “free” check-
ing account quite expensive.    
 
In recent years, some banks have encouraged unbanked individuals who express an inter-
est in opening an account to open transaction accounts without checking privileges.  These are 
low-cost low-minimum-balance accounts.  Individuals can withdraw money from their accounts 
by using an ATM or visiting a teller.  They can generally make debit card purchases using the 
ATM card, but the ATM card is usually an “on-line” card that does not permit the account holder 
to overdraw the account.  The account holder pays bills by purchasing money orders or by mak-
ing electronic transfers from the account.  There is no data yet on the success of these accounts, 
but they do appear to be well designed to meet the needs of many of the unbanked who wish to 
open starter accounts.   
 
Banks are also making efforts to create cost-effective means for LMI individuals to ob-
tain emergency loans ranging from $200 to $500.  Traditionally banks do not make such small 
loans except through credit card advances or some other prearranged line of credit, which ex-
cludes people unable to pass a traditional credit-risk screening procedure.  Many credit unions 
and banks offer deposit-secured credit cards to customers unable to meet traditional credit risk 
standards.  In addition, many credit unions will make deposit-secured small-value loans.  For ex-
ample, if a depositor has $500 in his account, he can borrow $500 rather than withdraw the 
money.  The deposit balance serves as the collateral.  Many customers apparently prefer to bor-
row the money rather than withdraw it because they like the budget discipline that repaying the 
loan imposes upon them.  Some credit unions have also begun to offer rapidly-disbursing unse-
cured small-value loans to customers who might not meet traditional credit risk standards.  Typi-
cally they require that the recipient has used direct deposit for several months and the loans are 
repaid out of future direct deposits.  Early reports from credit unions offering this service indi-
cate that it is popular and profitable for the credit unions (Richter and Tan, 2002). 
 
 The development and marketing of automated “payroll cards” is another recent private-
sector innovation that could benefit the unbanked.14  Until recently employers had to pay their 
                                                 
14A recent report on payroll cards issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency provides a nice overview of the type of 
cards on the market and their features (Frumkim et al, 2003). 
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unbanked employees using a check, or in some cases cash.  In recent years a number of firms 
have developed payroll cards that enable employers to pay unbanked employees electronically.  
A payroll card is an ATM-type card that employees can use at an ATM machine to withdraw 
their pay in cash.  In most cases, it can also be used as an on-line debit card.  The card is linked 
to an electronic account that keeps track of the balance available to the cardholder.  Although the 
number of payroll cards issued by mid-2003 was small compared to the unbanked population, 
the growth rate in the number of cards in use is reportedly high.  Whether this rapid growth con-
tinues will depend largely on the fees associated with using the card and on people’s willingness 
to change their payment habits.  It should be emphasized that individuals who use payroll cards 
do not have actual bank accounts in which they can make deposits, not can they have face-to-
face interactions with bank tellers.  Nevertheless, payroll cards have the potential to lower the 
costs of payment services to unbanked households.  In addition, over time they could be enriched 
to permit electronic bill payment and to offer an easy transition to non-checkable deposit ac-
counts.    
 
Finally, just as consumer banking is becoming increasingly automated, there are signs 
that the same may be true of check-cashing and bill-paying for the unbanked.  Several companies 
have developed and deployed automated check-cashing machines.  The large chain of retail con-
venience stores, 7-Eleven Incorporated, first installed automated check-cashing kiosks in several 
of its stores in 1998.  Since that time, it has worked to refine the technology.  Its current auto-
mated kiosks, known as “Vcom” kiosks, can cash paychecks, handle money order purchases and 
money transfers, pay bills through Western Union’s “Quick Collect” payment service and other 
services, and originate orders for many products sold over the internet.  As of December 2003, 7-
Eleven had placed Vcom kiosks in nearly 1,000 of its approximately 5,800 stores located across 
the U.S. (7-Eleven news release, December 11, 2003).  If this technology succeeds, it could 
lower the cost of delivering payment services to the unbanked and lower the fees that they pay.  
 
 
Summarizing the effectiveness of these initiatives  
 
As implied in the discussion above, we cannot know the aggregate impact that the out-
reach initiatives outlined above have had on the percentage of U.S. households without deposit 
accounts.  It is quite likely, however, that the aggregate effect has been quite small.  This is true 
for three reasons.  First, almost all of the initiatives have been small scale, pilot initiatives that 
would have small aggregate impacts even if they were effective.  Second, we argued that the ma-
jor reason that people do not have bank accounts is because they do not have any month-to-
month savings.  Assuming that successful methods can be found to help lower-income house-
holds build financial savings, the savings are likely to accumulate slowly.  Finally, available data 
do not indicate any major changes in the percentages of unbanked households over the past 25 
years.  In 1977, the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances found that 9.5 percent of all 
households did not have deposit accounts (Caskey and Peterson, 1994).  As noted in the intro-
duction to this paper, the same survey in 2001 found that the percentage was 9.1 percent.   
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III. The Urban Unbanked in Mexico  
 
This section uses a survey of households in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City to pro-
file the unbanked and to explain why they are unbanked.  In Mexico there has been no systematic 
national analysis of the extent to which people are inside and outside of the banking system.  In 
2002, the World Bank commissioned a survey in Mexico City Metropolitan Area. The survey, 
known as the Encuesta Nacional de Servicios Financieros (ENDSFI) was conducted by Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística, Geografía, e Informática (INEGI) as an addendum to the Encuesta Na-
cional de Empleo Urbano.  The survey sampled 1,500 households.  The surveys were conducted 
in face-to-face interviews with an 80 percent response rate.  For people using the survey data, 
INEGI supplies a set of weights to convert the sample responses into responses representative of 
11.4 million adults living in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City.  All of the tables in this paper 
are based on the ENDSFI survey and use the weighted data.  
 
 One basic weakness of the survey is that it focuses only on the largest city of the country.  
The population in this city differs from that in most other urban environments and differs dra-
matically from that in the rural areas, where almost 30 percent of the population lives.  Data from 
Mexico City, for example, could be misleading because it has the highest average income in the 
country, $14,180 U.S. dollars per capita in 2003 compared to a national average of $5,450.15  
Undoubtedly, due to this difference in average income and other factors, a national survey would 
find a larger percentage of the population to be unbanked compared to the percentage found in 
the capital city.  In terms of comparison, the Mexican survey drew on the city with highest per 
capita earnings, while the two cities surveyed in the U.S. were considered below average for that 
country.  
 
 Table 12 presents an overview of the socioeconomic characteristics of the survey popula-
tion.  As remarked in the introduction, income per capita in Mexico is about one fourth what it is 
in the United States. Indeed, the surveys show less than 45% of the U.S. households with annual 
income below US$15,000 compared with close to 80% in Mexico City.  As noted in the table, in 
Mexico City 23.6 percent of the population reported that they had savings in a bank (21.3% had 
savings but did not borrow from a bank and 1.8% had savings and credit from a bank).  As ex-
pected, this implies a much higher percentage of the population in Mexico is unbanked compared 
to the U.S.  While noteworthy, the differences in household income across the two countries do 
not appear to account for the differences in the coverage of banking services.    
 
 
                                                 
15 Estimated data of  GDP by SIREM March 12, 2004  
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Characteristics of the Survey Population % of the survey population
Age
18 to 29 years old 42.6
30 to 64 years old 49.3
65 or older 8.1
Sex
Male 19.6
Female 80.4
Highest completed level of education
Less than high school degree 48.5
High School degree or equivalent 30.6
More than high school 17.2
Illiterate 3.7
Household composition
No children in household 22.0
One or two Children 23.9
Three or more children 34.5
Have Economic Dependents 70.5
Housing status
Own Home 64.5
Rent Home 19.9
Lended Home 15.5
Employment status & non - labor income
Working full or part time 81.5
Not Working 17.4
Receive alimony or old-age pension and other payments 8.5
Receive medical insurance, life insurance or robbery insurance 0.3
Non - Labor income 15.5
Household Income in dollars
No - Income 18.3
$ 15, 000 or below 79.0
$15, 001 to $30, 000 2.3
$30, 001 to $45, 000 0.3
More than $45, 000 0.1
Banked & Unbanked
Banked 23.6
Unbanked 76.4
Bank Services
With Savings in a bank 21.3
With credit in a bank 0.6
Both 1.8
Table 12. Mexico City: economic characteristics of the survey population 
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A.  Who are the unbanked? 
 
 Table 13 contrasts the characteristics of the unbanked individuals with the banked.  Here 
a banked person is defined as someone who has a deposit account in a formal-sector deposit in-
stitution or who has credit from such an institution.  The unbanked thus include persons with 
“afore” account s- pension accounts opened by their employers on their behalf. This accounts for 
the approximately 25% of unbanked persons who reported formal savings. 
 
 
Percentage 
among the 
banked
Percentage 
among the 
unbanked
Age
18 to 29 years old 40.6% 43.2%
30 to 64 years old 50.5% 49.0%
65 or older 8.8% 7.9%
Sex
Male 19.1% 19.8%
Female 80.9% 80.2%
Highest Level of Education
Less than high school degree 44.2% 49.8%
High School degree or equivalent 31.1% 30.5%
More than high school 21.9% 15.7%
illiterate 2.8% 3.9%
Household composition
No children in household 24.4% 21.2%
One or two Children 25.8% 23.3%
Three or more children 30.7% 35.6%
Have Economic Dependents 76.0% 68.7%
Housing status
Own Home 69.3% 63.1%
Rent Home 18.0% 20.5%
Lended Home 12.7% 16.4%
Employment status & non - labor income
Working full or part time 95.1% 78.5%
Not Working 4.9% 21.5%
Receive Social Security, old-age pension or other 
payments 9.5% 8.2%
Receive medical insurance, life insurance or robbery 
insurance 0.4% 0.2%
Non - Labor income 24.4% 12.8%
Household Income in dollars
No - Income 10.2% 20.8%
$ 15, 000 or below 82.0% 78.0%
$15, 001 to $30, 000 6.4% 1.1%
$30, 001 to $45, 000 1.4%
More than $45, 000 0.1%
Did not maintain any formal savings 1.8% 74.9%
Table 13. Characteristics of Unbanked and Banked Households
Source: ENDESFI  
 
 40
As shown in the table, the unbanked population in Mexico is somewhat less educated than the 
banked population, is less likely to be working, and has a lower household income.  These pat-
terns are broadly consistent with those found in the U.S. survey.   
 
 
B.  Where do the unbanked get financial services? 
 
 Individuals who do not use banks still need financial services.  If they have any financial 
savings, they need a means to safeguard their savings.  If they receive income in the form of a 
check, they need a means to convert the check into cash.  They need to pay bills.  Finally, they 
many need to borrow periodically.  This subsection draws on the survey data to examine where 
and how the unbanked obtain these financial services.   
 
 Table 14 presents data on the forms in which the unbanked keep financial savings and 
contrasts this with the banked.  As noted in Table 13 above, 74.9 % of the unbanked said that 
they had no formal sector financial savings.  The survey also asked about the use of informal 
means of financial savings, such as holding cash, money orders, uncashed checks, jewelry that 
can be sold, etc.  As shown in Table 14, 18 percent of the unbanked respondents said that they 
use such means; only 1.1 % of the banked did.  Allowing for both formal and informal means of 
financial savings, 56% of the unbanked had no financial savings and 0.7% of the banked had 
none.    
 
 
Savings methods or sort of 
savings Banked Unbanked
Informal savings 1.1% 18.7%
Formal Savings 59.4% 15.8%
Both kinds of savings 38.9% 9.3%
Without savings 0.7% 56.2%
Table 14. Use of informal savings methods
Source: ENDESFI  
 
  
 Table 15 examines how people receive incomes and convert their incomes into cash.  
Among banked individuals, 54% received a deposit into either their savings or checking account, 
32 percent received a check, and 11.5% were paid in cash.  Among the unbanked, 85.6% were 
paid by check, 7.8% were paid in cash, and 6.3% received a deposit to a savings or checking ac-
count that is controlled by an employer.  
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Banked Unbanked
Way in which most income was received
Cash 11.5% 7.8%
Check 32.0% 85.6%
Checking account deposit 13.0% 1.4%
Savings account deposit 41.3% 4.9%
Other 2.2% 0.3%
Most common way to convert checks among 
those receiving check
Deposit in some account 19.4% 16.8%
Cash check in a bank 77.4% 80.0%
Other 3.2% 3.2%
Table 15. Forms of income and Means of Converting Checks
Source: ENDESFI  
 
 
In Mexico, unlike in the U.S, there are few practical alternatives for people to cash 
checks other than to go to a bank.  Banks in Mexico commonly cash checks for people who do 
not have deposit accounts and they do not charge a fee for this service.  As shown in Table 15, 
80% of the unbanked cash their income checks in a bank, or make a deposit into a relative’s or 
friend’s account.   
 
Table 16 presents data on the means that people use to pay bills.  As indicated in the ta-
ble, both unbanked and banked individuals pay the overwhelming proportion of their bills in 
cash.  The only notable exceptions are for payments of purchases of appliances and furniture and 
for purchases from department stores.  For such purchases, about 7.8% to 10.3% of the banked 
use credit cards.   
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Banked Unbanked Banked Unbanked
Communications Electricity
Cash 92.3% 97.6% Cash 93.8% 98.9%
Check 4.0% 0.6% Check 3.3% 0.5%
Credit card 3.2% 1.3% Credit card 2.6% 0.5%
Food Water supply
Cash 96.1% 99.5% Cash 94.1% 98.9%
Credit card 5.3% 0.8% Check 3.0% 0.4%
Check 1.1% Credit card 2.6% 0.7%
Health expenditure Furniture
Cash 97.5% 98.9% Cash 87.0% 99.3%
Check 1.5% 0.2% Check 3.9%
Credit card 1.5% 0.9% Credit card 7.8% 0.7%
Debit card 2.6%
Leisure articles Transportation service
Cash 89.8% 98.9% Cash 97.5% 99.0%
Credit card 6.8% 1.1% Credit card 1.2% 0.8%
Debit card 3.4% Debit card 1.2% 0.1%
Appliances Department stores
Cash 87.5% 98.4% Cash 82.1% 96.3%
Check 1.6% 0.8% Check 2.6%
Credit card 9.4% 1.6% Credit card 10.3% 2.5%
Debit card 3.1% Debit card 5.1% 1.3%
Rent Education
Cash 95.6% 97.2% Cash 94.7% 98.1%
Check 2.2% 1.4% Check 5.9% 2.1%
Debit card 2.2% 2.1%
Table 16. Means of Paying Bills
Source: ENDESFI  
 
  
 As shown in table 17, a large share of the individuals in the survey reported that they had 
requested credit from a department store. This credit was undoubtedly used to finance purchases. 
Among banked individuals, 38% requested a loan from a bank.  By definition, none of the un-
banked reported borrowing from a bank, however almost half of them reported requesting credit 
from a department store.  Significant percentages of banked and unbanked individuals borrowed 
from the “other” category, which refers to a variety of informal sources.  A striking result in ta-
ble 17 is the low percentage (0.8%) of individuals who reported that they used a money lender.  
Even more striking is that only banked individuals reported using a money lender as a source of 
credit.  We suspect that this pattern would not hold in a larger survey.   
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Looked for a loan from a: Banked Unbanked Total
Department  stores 26.7% 48.6% 38.5%
Other 16.7% 25.7% 21.5%
Commercial bank 38.3% 17.7%
Friend 3.3% 8.6% 6.2%
Credit card 8.3% 3.8%
Government 1.7% 5.7% 3.8%
SOFOL 1.7% 2.9% 2.3%
Credit union 3.3% 1.4% 2.3%
Savings bank 4.3% 2.3%
Worker funds 1.7% 1.4% 1.5%
Savings and loan association 1.4% 0.8%
NGOs 1.4% 0.8%
Moneylender 1.7% 0.8%
Table 17. Credit sources
Source: ENDESFI  
  
 
 
C.  Why don’t the unbanked use banks? 
 
 Individuals in the survey who reported that they did not have a bank account were asked 
why they do not.  Most (72%) responded that they had not tried to open an account.  As shown in 
table 18, when these individuals were asked why they had not tried to open an account, 49% re-
plied that they didn’t have enough money and another 11% stated that the minimum balance re-
quirement was too high.  Although a recent study has demonstrated that banks in Mexico City 
tend to locate in censal tracts with high income levels and up market commercial activity, are 
disproportionately represented in low income areas and practically absent from the “informal” 
neighborhoods16, only 3% of the respondents reported that bank location was a barrier.  This is 
similar to what was found the U.S.  Although bank offices have a far wider presence in the U.S. 
In both countries, financial access to banks was perceived as a much larger barrier than physical 
access.  Unlike in the U.S. where a large percentage of the unbanked say that they do not need a 
bank account because they don’t have any savings, only 7% of the unbanked in the Mexico City 
survey stated that they did not need an account.  This difference could be due to the wording of 
the survey or could reflect the absence in Mexico City of institutions, such as check-cashing out-
lets, that provide convenient payment services for unbanked individuals.  Another difference be-
tween the responses in Mexico and the U.S. is that almost 9% of Mexicans in the capital city said 
that they did not trust the banks, a response that was well under 1% in the U.S.  Undoubtedly, 
this reflects the turbulent history of Mexican banks over the past 20 years.    
                                                 
16  Ruiz, as cited in Solo et. al, 2003 
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Doesn't have enough money 49.3%
Very high Minimum balance 11.0%
Didn't trust in the bank 8.7%
Low interests rates 7.5%
Doesn't need it 6.9%
Didn't know how to open 4.7%
The bank is so far 3.2%
High fees 2.6%
Bad service 2.0%
Bank hours inconvenient 1.8%
Other 1.8%
They don't have the basic documentation 0.2%
Table 18. Why the unbanked  haven't attempted to 
open a bank account?
Source: ENDESFI  
 
A small percentage of the unbanked (2.7%) reported that they tried to open a deposit ac-
count but were not able to do so.  As shown in table 19, two-thirds of them could not do so be-
cause they did not have the required minimum initial deposit.  Another 22% did not have the re-
quired documents or personal references.  It is likely that many of these individuals work in the 
informal sector where written documents are rare and where formalities are often avoided to pre-
vent governmental authorities from tracking business operations. 
 
 
Total
Didn't have basic documentation 15.6%
Didn't have money for the minimum deposit 66.7%
Didn't have personal references 6.7%
Didn't have bank references 2.2%
Other 8.9%
Table 19. Why they couldn't open a bank account?
Source: ENDESFI  
 
 
In the survey, 13.5 % of the respondents reported that they had applied for a loan from a 
bank.  As shown in Table 20, of this group 74 % received the credit, 20% were rejected and 6% 
were still in the approval process at the time of the survey.   
 
Total
Accepted 10.1
In approval process 0.8
2.7
86.5
Total 100.0
Source: ENDESFI
Yes
Yes, but it was rejected
No
Table 20. Did you apply for any credit in the last 3 years?
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As indicated in table 21, most of the people whose applications for a bank loan were denied 
believed that they were denied due to bank concerns about the risks associated with the loan.  These 
risks were caused by a lack of a credit history, insufficient or unsteady earnings, and the lack of 
collateral or an outside guarantee.  
 
Total
Didn't have Credit background 20.7%
Didn't have enough earnings 17.2%
Other 17.2%
Didn't have guarantees 13.8%
Civil status, sex or age 10.3%
Didn't have collateral 6.9%
Didn't have steady income 6.9%
High amount 3.4%
Credit propose 3.4%
Total 100%
Table 21.  Why your credit application was rejected?
Source: ENDESFI  
 
Among those individual who reported that they did not apply for bank credit, 71% said 
that they did not need any bank loans or that they preferred to finance their purchases out of their 
income flows (Table 22).  Much smaller percentages cited factors that suggested a fear of being 
rejected.  This suggests that many people never or rarely borrow or have other sources of credit 
so that a lack of access to bank credit does not cause a hardship. 
 
Total
Didn't  require it 37.0%
Prefers to use own income 33.7%
They have other options 0.9%
A lot of requirements 6.6%
Didn't trust in the financial institutions sector 1.4%
Didn't have a job 3.7%
Didn't have a job 6.9%
Didn't have a collateral 1.4%
High amount 0.3%
High interest rate 4.2%
High fees 0.7%
Didn't know who to get it 0.9%
Didn't have enough information 0.8%
Didn't have guarantee 0.1%
Other 1.6%
Total 100.0%
Table 22. Why you didn't apply for any credit?
Source: ENDESFI  
 
Finally, as shown in table 23, of the individuals who reported that they had taken out a 
bank loan, 65% were still making payments on the loans.  The survey did not ask whether or not 
they had experienced periods of delinquencies with their payments. 
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Total
Totally paid 21.9%
In payment process 65.0%
Without using it 13.1%
Total 100%
Table 23. Credit status
Source: ENDESFI  
 
 
D. What is the problem with being unbanked in Mexico? 
 
There are no formal studies of the costs paid by Mexicans as a result of having such a 
large percentage of the population outside of the banking system, but there are good reasons to 
believe that these costs could be significant. They must, for example, pay extra fees to pay their 
utility bills through a bank. The 83% who are paid by check must pay, direct commissions or 
through favors and time to cash salary checks.  Focus group interviews and cost surveys carried 
out as part of a World Bank survey of Mexico City’s unbanked suggest that households earning 
below median income (about U.S. $2,500) can spend up to $100 – or 0.5% per year on such extra 
fees, not counting the time lost – a heavy burden for persons dependent on daily wages. In addi-
tion, the lack of a deposit account can make it difficult for households to build assets.  The 
households may lack a safe place to guard any financial savings that they may have.  More im-
portantly, one’s access to formal-sector credit is linked to the maintenance of a bank account.  
And credit can be used to acquire such non-financial assets as a home or an automobile, to 
smooth consumer purchases over time, or to finance small business activities.  The cost of credit 
outside the formal banking system is high, as the data in Box 1, below. Finally, all Mexicans 
may pay a price as a result of such a large percentage of the population being outside of the 
banking system, as informal savings are often not channeled to productive activities, lowering 
the potential rate of growth of the economy.  Box 2, on the following page, estimates the costs of 
being unbanked to a median income couple in Mexico City at 15% of total income. The indi-
viduals who are unbanked bear most of these costs. 
 
 
 Box 1 Non-bank credit terms are expensive  
Origin Purpose Monthly 
Interest 
Rate 
Payments Loan size Loan term 
 
Grocery Store  
 
Food 
 
   
30% 
 
 Daily US$5 to 
US$15 
 
Weekly and 
Bi-weekly 
Stores offering ‘lay-
away ’plans  
*clothes  
*home furnishings 
*sports goods 
 
30% Weekly 
 
 
US$10 to 
US$50 
One to three 
months  
Chain Stores 
consumer loans 
 
Consumer durables 
Electro-domestic items, 
Building materials   
 
      15%         Weekly  US$150 to 
US$1000 
Six months 
“Cajas” 
Popular Savings 
Associations 
 
 
Open 
 6% to 10% Twice  
or three times a 
year 
US$100 to 
US$500 
Three to six 
months 
Source: Solo et. al., 2003  
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Source: Solo et. al., 2003
Box 2  Thecost of being unbanked can run high for Mexican families 
Rogelio is an informal vendor of candies and other snack foods in downtown Mexico City.  He and his wife 
(who works in a factory) make roughly the same income: 2 minimum wages or MX$80 per day which 
tranSCItes to around MX$2000 a month each. This puts them near the 40th  percentile of Mexico City’s1 
wage earners. Rogelio’s wife has to make the family’s payments as Rogelio can’t leave his stall unattended 
for extended periods to go to make payments:  
1. Time and Travel Costs. 
Cashing checks- Rogelio’s wife cashes her paycheck twice a month at a bank costing her 4 hours 
and MX$10 in travel cost. 
Paying Bills- Rogelio’s wife also pays electricity, water and telephone bills during the work week 
(offices closed on weekends): 7.5 hours of waiting in line and 4.5 hours of travel once a month for 
all 3 offices for a total of 12 hours lost plus MX$10 in travel cost. 
  Yearly Total: for lost time is MX$1920   
Yearly Total: for travel cost is MX$240 
2. An Informal Loan-Typical loan for Rogelio is a month and a half of salary or MX$30002. At most 
he uses one loan every year for a consumer good.  MX$3000 paid in 6 months has a rate of 30% 
for the period in a Mexican bank in May 20033. The market stall vendor rate is 50% per month. If 
Rogelio takes 2 months to pay the loan his cost is MX$900 at the bank and MX$3000 through a 
vendor.  
Yearly Total: An opportunity cost of  informality of MX$2100. 
3. Unrealised Profits - Rogelio’s Average Daily Sales are MX$200 and his Average Cost: MX $120. 
Cost with unrealised 10% discount for buying in bulk with more funds: MX$108.  Bulk Buying 
Profit minus his actual profits amount to MX$92 – MX$80 =MX$12 per day or MX$312 per 
month (26 days as he works Saturdays).    
  Yearly Total: An unrealized Profit of MX$3744. 
4. Loss of Interest on Savings. Assume Rogelio saves one month of his salary per year under the 
mattress. A bank’s minimum interest rate in 2003 is 1% per year. If Rogelio had savings in Banco 
Azteca’s time deposit account with a one month term then the interest rate would be 5% per year 
in 2003. Saving in a tanda for 3 separate terms (each time he saves MX$2000) will give him 
enough for the opening balance (MX$5000 assuming he is able to put away this large sum of 
money). His lost interest earnings would be:  
Yearly Total:  Keeping just the minimum balance, yearly interest would pay MX$250 
that he would not get in a tanda. 
Adding this up implies a Yearly Cost of: MX$7254 for Being Unbanked.  This is  equivalent to nearly 
two full month’s income for Rogelio’s family or around 15% of their total annual household income. 
_______________________________________ 
1. Income distribution in Mexico City is higher than in the rest of the country.   Thus on a national level Rogelio’s family would be 
higher on the income distribution scale. Therefore the costs of being  unbanked for a family of median income on a national scale 
are likely to be a greater as a percentage of total family income. 
2. As a point of comparison, Bital and Bancomer banks offer credit limits at 3 months of income for their lower income clients (e.g. 
Anticipo de Nomina Bital).  
3. See Banamex.com 
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E. Bank initiatives to bring the unbanked into the banking system  
 
By necessity, much of financial sector policy over the past decade has focused on restor-
ing the financial health of the banking system.  In the 1980s and again in 1994-95, the banking 
system was subject to severe crises that left it deeply undercapitalized and preoccupied with 
managing troubled portfolios.  At the time of this writing, however, the banking system has made 
substantial progress toward recovery.  In addition, it has changed as many weak domestic banks 
were been acquired by foreign banks.  Nevertheless, as shown in table 24, levels of intermedia-
tion have continued to fall.  Undoubtedly, the weak state of the banking system over much of the 
past decade constrained its growth and limited its ability to think about new initiatives. 
 
 
Total Financing Private 
Sector 
Financing
Direct Financing 
(4 - 7)
Consumer 
credit
Housing Enterprises Non banking 
financial 
intermediaries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1994 44.9 43.0 43.0 3.3 7.1 30.9 1.7
1995 44.3 41.7 33.8 2.2 5.5 24.6 1.5
1996 36.3 34.4 20.5 1.3 2.4 16.1 0.7
1997 31.7 29.1 15.9 1.0 2.4 12.2 0.4
1998 29.7 27.3 14.3 0.8 2.0 11.1 0.4
1999 25.1 22.9 11.6 0.8 1.7 8.6 0.6
2000 20.0 18.2 9.7 0.8 1.3 7.2 0.4
2001 18.5 16.4 8.8 1.0 1.0 6.2 0.6
2002 17.3 15.6 8.9 1.3 0.9 6.2 0.5
2003 * 17.0 14.6 8.6 1.6 0.9 5.6 0.5
Source: Banco de México. Webpage January 2004
* Up to september 
Table 24.  Bank Financing (as percentage of GDP)
 
 
In recent years, however, banks have introduced new products that could benefit a sig-
nificant share of the unbanked.  Most importantly, 12 of the 45 commercial banks in Mexico City 
offer payroll debit cards.  These cards enable a worker who does not have a traditional deposit 
account to be paid electronically.  The worker can use the card to withdraw funds from an ATM 
or to purchase goods at a store that accepts debit cards.  The card is linked to an electronic ac-
count that keeps track of the remaining balance.  The account is not a true bank account, how-
ever, since the worker cannot make independent deposits into the account or write checks on the 
account.  Bank began to offer these accounts partly in response to pressures from unions, which 
demanded the cards as a way to reduce insecurity in payments. Reportedly, payroll debit cards 
have been quite successful among workers, white and blue collar. 
 
The second, and even more interesting initiative, came from a non-bank.  A large de-
partment store chain, Elektra, with a largely working-class clientele, applied to obtain a banking 
charter, which the authorities granted.  Elektra named its bank “Banco Azteca,” and located 
many of its offices within its department stores.  The bank structured its products, both deposit 
accounts and loans, to meet the needs of moderate- and middle-income households.  It makes, for 
example, small-valued unsecured personal loans, although Banco Azteca levies relatively high 
interest rates on these loans to make them profitable.  Banco Azteca appears to be very successful 
which could encourage other banks to start serving this market.  Banco Azteca opened its first 
office in 2002.  By mid-2003, it had over two million deposit accounts and 836 branches.  Un-
doubtedly, part of the basis for such rapid growth was that the bank could market to households 
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that had been credit customers of Elektra.  And, by opening small branches within existing de-
partment stores, the bank could keep its facilities costs low.   
 
 
F. Non-bank initiatives to attend the unbanked  
 
Some finance companies, institutions that make loans but do not take deposit accounts, 
have sought to serve lower-income households.  Formally, these non-bank financial institutions 
are known as Sociedades Financieras de Objeto Limitado (SOFOLES).  They are also called 
“specialized” banks since they are exclusively dedicated to one sector (for example: construc-
tion, automobile, etc) or activity (for example, credit cards).  They finance their assets by selling 
debt securities or by obtaining financing from other financial institutions. Their main activity 
consists in granting loans for the acquisition of specific assets such as cars or houses, or issuing 
credit cards. SOFOLES has become the main source of financing for new auto purchases, mak-
ing it possible for many people to buy cars who might not be able to obtain bank financing for 
this purpose.  The housing SOFOLES do not generally provide housing financing to low-income 
families.  Their market niche is middle- to high-income households.    
 
 
TOTAL 
FINANCING
BANKS NON BANKS TOTAL 
FINANCING
BANKS NON BANKS
1994 3.6 3.4 0.2 1994 7.3 7.3 0.0
1995 2.5 2.3 0.2 1995 9.2 9.1 0.1
1996 1.6 1.4 0.2 1996 8.6 8.5 0.0
1997 1.4 1.1 0.3 1997 7.8 7.6 0.2
1998 1.4 0.9 0.5 1998 7.0 6.7 0.3
1999 1.3 0.8 0.5 1999 6.0 5.6 0.4
2000 1.4 0.9 0.5 2000 4.4 3.9 0.5
2001 1.7 1.1 0.6 2001 3.9 3.1 0.7
2002 2.1 1.4 0.7 2002 3.8 2.8 1.0
2003* 2.4 1.7 0.7 2003* 3.7 2.4 1.2
TOTAL 
FINANCING
BANKS NON BANKS TOTAL 
FINANCING
BANKS NON BANKS
1994 59.6 32.5 27.1 1994 70.5 43.1 27.3
1995 58.1 31.1 26.9 1995 69.8 42.6 27.2
1996 46.7 24.7 22.0 1996 56.9 34.7 22.3
1997 40.5 19.5 20.9 1997 49.7 28.3 21.5
1998 38.8 16.4 22.4 1998 47.2 24.1 23.1
1999 31.6 13.0 18.6 1999 39.0 19.4 19.5
2000 29.4 10.3 19.0 2000 35.2 15.1 20.1
2001 26.8 8.8 18.0 2001 32.4 13.0 19.4
2002 27.4 8.6 18.8 2002 33.4 12.8 20.5
2003* 27.8 7.9 19.9 2003* 33.8 12.1 21.8
Source: Banco de México Web Page January 2004
* Up to september 2003
Table 25. Emergence of non bank credit (as percentage of GDP)
BUSINESS CREDIT TOTAL FINANCING
HOUSING CREDITCONSUMER CREDIT
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G. Popular banks and financial services for lower-income households  
 
In addition to traditional commercial banks and finance companies, the Mexican financial 
system includes a variety of semi-formal and informal small-scale “popular” banks.  Tradition-
ally, these popular banks served moderate-income households, providing both credit and deposit 
facilities.  They were largely unregulated, and many were severely undercapitalized.  Most of the 
popular banks are organized as cooperatives.  
 
In the 1990s, the government recognized that the popular banks could play an important 
role in serving lower-income households, but it also wanted to limit the risk that these banks cre-
ated for their depositors and for the financial system.  Consequently, the government initiated a 
series of measures intended to clarify their rules of operations and to bring them into regulatory 
oversight.  Its first step was to broaden financial legislation to bring in the Cajas de Ahorro 
Popular; transforming them into regulated Sociedades de Ahorro y Prestámo (savings and loan 
associations, SAP law 1991).  Many savings and credit cooperatives remain ouside that legal 
framework and promote a new law in 1994 which further segments the sector.  The process cul-
minated in 2001, when the Congress enacted the “Ley de Ahorro y Crédito Popular” designed to 
encompass the entire sector and bring it under the supervision of the Comisión Nacional Ban-
caria y de Valores (CNBV); simultaneously the old National Savings Board (Patronato del 
Ahorro Nacional)17 was transformed into “Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros” 
(BANSEFI) in order to coordinate the reorganization of all popular financial intermediaries and 
to serve as development agency for these institutions by implementing (non-credit) support pro-
grams intended to ensure that they follow sound banking practices.  The main goal of the new 
legislation is to lend credibility to the popular institutions and to promote healthy financial in-
termediation among the low- and middle-income groups.  
 
 BANSEFI is a descendent of the “Patronato del Ahorro Nacional”, commonly identified 
by its main product the “Bonos del Ahorro Nacional” which collected savings but did not make 
private-sector loans.  BANSEFI continues to provide this savings service, but as noted above it 
also functions as a development bank, or “second floor” bank, to assist and support programs 
that could help popular banks to increase their income, reduce costs, improve their management, 
and broaden the services that popular intermediaries could provide to their members.  One of the 
first tasks of BANSEFI was to develop a database on all popular banking institutions.  For this 
purpose in 2002 BANSEFI conducted a census of the entities (Entidades de Ahorro y Crédito 
Popular),18 including those financial institutions that were not recognized officially by the finan-
cial authorities.   
 Table 26 presents an overview of the results from this census.  As shown in the table, the 
cooperatives with the largest membership are the savings and loan associations (Sociedades de 
Ahorro y Préstamo), which are formally regulated, and the non-regulated savings and loan coop-
eratives (Cooperativas de Ahorro y Prestámo).  The third largest membership is that of the Cajas 
Solidarias.  These were originally rural savings institutions which were instituted in a number of 
                                                 
17 It continues playing its old role of enhancing the savings culture through its deposit instruments, but does not make private-
sector loans as all of its funds are channeled to the public sector.  To enhance its ability to collect funds and increase savings, the 
institution can offer tax-exempt interest and/or premiums in order to increase savings. 
18 BANSEFI Diagnóstico de la Situación Financiera, Equipamiento Tecnológico y censo de las Entidades de Ahorro y Crédito 
Popular (EACP) Informe Versión Pública Junio de 2002.  
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communities using funds provided by the government and technical support from Développe-
ment Iternational Desjardins of Canada.  The average deposit in a Cajas Solidarias is around 
U.S. $700 and the average loan is about $600.  Credit unions have larger average deposits of 
about $2,000 and average loans of about $4,000.  
 
Type of EACP Number Members Assets Liabilities Equity Deposits Credit 
Portfolio
Cooperativas de Ahorro y Préstamo
(CAPs)
186 1,013,580 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.10
Sociedades de Ahorro y Préstamo
(SAPs)
7 639,816 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.05
Uniones de Crédito (UC) 24 39,380 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02
Cajas Solidarias (CS) 129 142,850 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Asociaciones Civiles (AC) 18 116,042 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
Sociedades Civiles (SC) 5 1,253 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sociedad de Solidaridad Social (SSS) 10 2,079 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other 9 133,537 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 388 2,088,537 0.30 0.26 0.04 0.23 0.20
Source: BANSEFI
as percentage of GDP
Table 26. Popular Banking Institutions, Assets, Liabilities and Equity
 
 
  
 Recent estimates of BANSEFI show that in 2003, membership in popular banking institu-
tions reached 2.9 million persons.  If we add the direct clients of BANSEFI, a grand total of 
5,378,094 persons benefit from the services of the “Popular Banking Network” or Red de la 
Gente.  BANSEFI’s direct clients had an average deposit balance in September 2003 of $120 
U.S. dollars.19 As noted earlier, BANSEFI does not make loans to its direct clients.  The average 
deposit balance suggests that BANSEFI reaches a population with lower average incomes than 
that of Popular Banking Network.  
 
 One of the reasons that BANSEFI serves households with lower levels of income than 
those served by popular banks is its diversity of financial products. It has, for example, devel-
oped a deposit account, similar to the standard account (Tandahorro) at a popular bank that al-
lows small savers to set up a medium-term savings goal with a specified set of periodic deposits 
to meet that goal.  But the account at BANSEFI is guaranteed a yield above inflation.  It has also 
developed an account for housing linked to the government-housing program “INFONAVIT” as 
well as savings accounts for children and a savings account that offers a chance to win a lottery.  
Another element that has helped BANSEFI’s success has been the location of its branch offices, 
which are commonly located to be convenient to the residents of low-income communities.  It 
could be argued that Popular Banking under the coordination of BANSEFI has become the cor-
nerstone of the institutional framework for the unbanked.  
 
                                                 
19 As reported by Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores in its web page: www.cnbv.gob.mx. 
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H.  Microfinance companies   
 
 A number of microfinance companies were launched in Mexico in the 1980s, but they 
still have only a small role in the overall financial system.  The companies received their funds 
from non-governmental organizations, and usually distributed loans through solidarity groups of 
about 5 people that the borrowers are required to form, à la Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.  Some 
microfinance organizations require or encourage their members to make small deposits with the 
organizations.  They do so in an effort to promote a savings culture.   
 
 In 2001, the federal government established a program (Programa Nacional de Finan-
ciamiento al Microempresario, PRONAFIM) to support microfinance companies.  Since that 
time, 37 companies have been accepted into the program and have been granted resources to in-
crease the size of their operations. The size of the loan ranges from U.S. $27 up to $454 per per-
son in a solidarity group.  
 
 
I. Interactions among outreach initiatives 
 
 Although there are a variety of initiatives to increase the access that lower-income house-
holds have to formal-sector and semi-formal sector financial services, one weakness of these ef-
forts is a lack of coordination and interaction.  One exception should be noted.  A microfinance 
company (CAME) and a bank (BANAMEX) teamed up to issue debit cards to members of 
CAME’s solidarity groups in order to reduce the members’ transaction costs. This sort of interac-
tion is promising, as it builds on the technological sophistication of the large banks and the grass-
roots presence of informal institutions.  If such models were to become more common, they 
could greatly strengthen outreach efforts.   
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IV.  Assessing of the Outreach Efforts Underway in the U.S. and Mexico 
 
 In this final section, we briefly review the rationale and challenges facing the strategies 
that both countries are employing to improve the financial services available to lower-income 
households.  In doing so, we do not mean to imply that government agencies and private sector 
institutions in either country share an overall strategic vision.  Often, in fact, efforts to improve 
financial services for lower-income households are piecemeal and uncoordinated.  Nevertheless, 
the combination of these efforts provides a general strategic outline, even if no organization has 
enunciated the components and rational for that outline.   
 
 In the case of the U.S., the major efforts have two goals: first, to reduce the cost of finan-
cial services for households that continue to live from paycheck to paycheck and, second, to help 
more of these households build financial savings.  As discussed earlier, efforts to reduce the cost 
of financial services for households living without financial savings include state laws that limit 
the fees that non-bank financial institutions, such as check-cashing outlets or small-loan firms, 
can charge for payment or credit services.  They also include the use of technology, such as pay-
roll cards and automated check-cashing machines, that can lower the cost of providing a basic 
financial service.  The measures are undoubtedly positive, but in our view they are likely to have 
a modest impact.  For one, the evidence indicates that state laws that simply set ceilings on the 
fees that non-bank financial institutions can charge for financial services can only lower those 
fees a small degree before they adversely impact the willingness of those institutions to provide 
the services.  In addition, the cost savings from the use of technology in payments have been 
modest as a percentage of the incomes of even poor households and technology has done little to 
lower the cost of high-risk lending.  Such lending remains labor intensive and, given the small 
value of the advances, this results in high interest rates.  Technological advances, such as the 
computers that manage credit cards, have lowered credit costs for low- and moderate-risk bor-
rowers, have done much less for labor-intensive high-risk credit.   
 
The one exception to our claim that gains from lowering the cost of payment services 
have been modest is international remittances.  As noted earlier, fees for remittances, especially 
for transfers between the U.S. and Mexico, have declined substantially.  But much of the gain 
here came from making what had been a nearly monopolistic and opaque wire transfer service 
much more transparent and competitive.   
 
 In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on helping lower-income U.S. house-
holds to build financial assets.  A variety of factors have led to this shift in emphasis.  First, nu-
merous studies have found that a lack of financial savings is the major barrier preventing lower-
income households from maintaining bank deposits.  Second, households without savings have 
no financial margin of safety, so any adverse financial shock can cause them to miss payment 
obligations, placing them in a high credit risk profile.  Third, some researchers argue that the ac-
cumulation of savings will affect the psychological orientation of these households.  They will 
become more able to plan for the future and feel more in control of their lives.  More generally, 
there is broad recognition that the possession of savings makes one less vulnerable to financial 
shocks and reduces the stress in one’s life.    
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As noted earlier, asset-building initiatives take a variety of forms.  One set of initiatives 
attempts to make deposit accounts financially and culturally accessible to a broader set of indi-
viduals.  Accordingly, banks have begun to promote basic savings accounts accessible by ATM 
and on-line debit cards rather than basic checking accounts.  Since the savings accounts cannot 
be overdrawn, banks can offer them to almost anyone with little risk.  In addition, banks have 
formed partnerships with check-cashing outlets to enable the banks to deliver deposit services 
through the outlets in which many of the unbanked may feel more comfortable. The motivating 
idea is that financial and cultural access to a deposit account may help many individuals to build 
savings, which will ultimately give them access to a broader array of lower-cost financial ser-
vices.  As an additional inducement to people to build savings, some financial institutions pro-
mote small value time deposit accounts in which individuals pledge to make regularly scheduled 
deposits similar to the “Christmas Club” accounts that were common decades ago.   
 
Financial education and Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a second set of ini-
tiatives intended to promote asset accumulation by lower-income households.  In the case of 
IDAs the challenge is to demonstrate that they can be cost effective.  As noted earlier, the IDAs 
that have been studied most carefully have had very high operating costs relative to the savings 
their participants generated.  In the case of financial education, there is also a pressing need to 
validate with empirical studies the notion that low-cost educational efforts will actually help 
lower-income households to build savings or improve credit histories.  Finally, there is also no 
rigorous evidence that supports the view that simply providing the unbanked with financial and 
cultural access to a deposit account will help them build savings.  Research on all of these topics 
would be helpful.     
 
Although much attention has gone in recent years to the unbanked in the U.S., the prob-
lem is far more important in Mexico where a minority of the population uses the formal financial 
system.  As noted earlier, this may not only be costly to those outside of the banking system, but 
could even slow the growth rate of the Mexican economy.  An underdeveloped formal financial 
system could impede the channeling of saving to productive investment opportunities.   
 
In the case of Mexico, there are three likely reasons that the problem is so much larger in 
scale.  First, as discussed earlier, incomes are much lower in Mexico so a much higher percent-
age of the population lives without financial savings.  Second, a large segment of the population 
works in the informal sector and lacks the documentation and employer or union structures that 
would give them access to the banking system.  Third, the banking system in Mexico is highly 
concentrated.  Perhaps as a result of the lack of competition (table 27), the required minimum 
balance to avoid fees is much greater relative to incomes in Mexico than in the U.S (table 28).  
This observation undoubtedly contributes to the high percentage of the unbanked who cite mini-
mum balance requirements as the barrier to opening a banks account. 
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Number of 
Checking 
accounts
Number of 
savings 
accounts
Number of 
term deposits
Number of 
credit cards 
accounts
Branches by 
bank Personnel.
National number of accounts, 
branches and personnel 16,778,808 11,533,662 3,777,994 12,408,703 7,801 112,229
Mexico city total 4,177,797 3,062,459 728,762 4,774,387 1,508 43,561
HSBC 1,254,288 57,757 116,192 124,666 270 6,171
BBVA 351,443 2,630,229 154,452 1,810,223 297 10,455
Banamex (Citibank) 760,553 7,787 260,241 2,127,747 241 12,651
Santander Serfin 975,977 15,302 61,505 40,581 200 4,327
Share of 4 largest banks (%) 80.0 88.5 81.3 85.9 66.8 77.1
Scotiabank Inverlat 269,113 43,039 46,513 90,980 88 3,085
Banorte 356,046 1,087 75,082 36,044 219 3,055
Inbursa 139,196 0 140 1,092 13 675
Ixe 34,239 90 3,236 2,740 17 536
Share of 8 largest banks (%) 99.1 90.0 98.4 88.7 89.2 94.0
Source: CNBV September 2003.
Table 27. Mexico banks concentration 
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Cheking Account 
with interest
Cheking account 
without interest
Savings 
Accounts
Children's 
Savings 
Accounts
Stage 1. Minimum Deposit is matched by income: yes or no
Minimum deposit required $8,704.6 $3,076.9 $800.0 $387.6
Income percentile 25 th: no no yes yes
$ 1, 547
Income percentile 50 th: no no yes yes
$ 2, 380
Income percentile 75 th:
$ 3, 703 no yes yes yes
Income percentile 100 th:
$ 11, 619 yes yes yes yes
Minimum balance required
$7,391.3 $2,666.7 $900.0 $287.5
Income percentile 25 th:
$ 1, 547 no no yes yes
Income percentile 50 th:
$ 2, 380 no yes yes  yes
Income percentile 75 th:
$ 3, 703 no yes yes yes
Income percentile 100 th:
$ 11, 619 yes yes yes yes
Stage 3. Montly charges should not exced 0.01% of monthly income: yes or no
Maintenance fee $18.6 $16.6 $6.0 $2.6
Income percentile 25 th:
$ 1, 547 no yes yes yes
Income percentile 50 th:
$ 2, 380 yes yes yes yes
Income percentile 75 th:
$ 3, 703 yes yes yes yes
Income percentile 100 th:
$ 11, 619 yes yes yes yes
Source: Own estimatios with datum of Bansefi.
Table 28. High costs and low income groups access to the banking system
Stage 2. Minimum balance is matched by income: yes or no
 
 
 
The Mexican government recognizes that a lack of competition among banks likely con-
tributes to high bank fees and the high percentages of people outside of the banking system.  It 
has embarked on a three-pronged policy to address the problem.  First, it has recently begun to 
apply verbal pressure to encourage large banks to make basic deposit accounts financially acces-
sible to moderate-income households (New York Times, April 7, 2004, p. W1).  Second, the gov-
ernment has allowed a new bank (Banco Azteca) that targets middle- and moderate-income 
households to open.  Its success could demonstrate to other banks or investors that this can be a 
profitable market.  Third, under BANSEFI, the government is working to expand the popular 
banking sector and to improve its financial stability.   
 
In our view, the government’s priorities are correct.  Considering the large market power 
of a small number of big banks, pressure should be applied to these banks to do more to serve 
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moderate-income households.  A simple way to begin is to promote the use of payroll cards as a 
way to make people comfortable with non-cash means of making payments and maintaining 
short-term savings.  In addition, the government might consider implementing a variation on the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), the U.S. legislation that puts mild pressure on banks to 
serve moderate-income communities.  The entry into the Mexican banking system of Banco Az-
teca, with it focus on middle- and moderate-income households, is also a positive development.  
The government should encourage other investors to compete with Banco Azteca in this market, 
while ensuring that they maintain sound banking controls and balance sheets.  Finally, the effort 
to strengthen the oversight and financial stability of the popular banks, while also aiding their 
outreach, could bring many benefits.     
 
The growth and stabilization of the popular banking sector can bring two major benefits 
to the Mexican financial system.  First, it provides more competition for the large commercial 
banks which could lower their fees.  Second, the popular banks, which mainly serve moderate-
income consumers and small businesses, can operate much more informally than traditional 
banks.  In simple terms, they do not need lobbies made of marble.  This means that they can be 
financially and culturally accessible to moderate-income households.  If their offices have a simi-
lar appearance to other businesses or non-profit organizations that serve moderate-income 
households, then their target clientele will feel comfortable in this setting.  In addition, by having 
a secure but informal setting, their operating costs will be lower which will allow them to serve 
moderate-income communities profitably.  While we support the growth of popular banks, we do 
not do so at the cost of the stability of the financial system.  But we do not believe that this 
tradeoff is necessary. The U.S. experience with community development banking has demon-
strated the stability and profitability of “popular banking.” It has also proved a source of invest-
ment for traditional commercial banks.  
 
As in the U.S., future Mexican policy would benefit from more research.  The ENDESFI 
survey was invaluable in providing a baseline survey of the use of financial services by house-
holds in Mexico City.  Additional research should develop this further and also focus on the 
business models of financial institutions, both banks and non-banks that currently serve moder-
ate-income households.  This will provide policy makers and private sector institutions a better 
understanding of how moderate-income households obtain financial services, what they pay form 
then, and what might be done to lower the cost or improve the quality of these services.     
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